If you want to understand what's wrong with European immigration policy, Christopher Caldwell's 2009 book Reflections on the Revolution in Europe is the best start:
In his provocative and unflinching book Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, he reveals the anger of natives and newcomers alike. He describes asylum policies that have served illegal immigrants better than refugees. He exposes the strange interaction of welfare states and Third World traditions, the anti-Americanism that brings natives and newcomers together, and the arguments over women and sex that drive them apart. And he examines the dangerous tendency of politicians to defuse tensions surrounding Islam by curtailing the rights of all.
He has a long new piece on the French real estate consultant Christophe Guilluy, who was become an improbable analyst of French society. Actually, not so improbable: Choosing where to live strips away the bullshit and lays peoples' actual preferences (as opposed to their public pieties) about multiculturalism, diversity, etc. bare. Guilluy uses urban geography to create an analysis of the divisions plaguing French society:
In our day, the urban real-estate market is a pitiless sorting machine. Rich people and up-and-comers buy the private housing stock in desirable cities and thereby bid up its cost. Guilluy notes that one real-estate agent on the Île Saint-Louis in Paris now sells “lofts” of three square meters, or about 30 square feet, for €50,000. The situation resembles that in London, where, according to Le Monde, the average monthly rent (£2,580) now exceeds the average monthly salary (£2,300).
The laid-off, the less educated, the mistrained—all must rebuild their lives in what Guilluy calls (in the title of his second book) La France périphérique. This is the key term in Guilluy’s sociological vocabulary, and much misunderstood in France, so it is worth clarifying: it is neither a synonym for the boondocks nor a measure of distance from the city center. (Most of France’s small cities, in fact, are in la France périphérique.) Rather, the term measures distance from the functioning parts of the global economy. France’s best-performing urban nodes have arguably never been richer or better-stocked with cultural and retail amenities. But too few such places exist to carry a national economy. When France’s was a national economy, its median workers were well compensated and well protected from illness, age, and other vicissitudes. In a knowledge economy, these workers have largely been exiled from the places where the economy still functions. They have been replaced by immigrants.
After the mid-twentieth century, the French state built a vast stock—about 5 million units—of public housing, which now accounts for a sixth of the country’s households. Much of it is hideous-looking, but it’s all more or less affordable. Its purpose has changed, however. It is now used primarily for billeting not native French workers, as once was the case, but immigrants and their descendants, millions of whom arrived from North Africa starting in the 1960s, with yet another wave of newcomers from sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East arriving today. In the rough northern suburb of Aubervilliers, for instance, three-quarters of the young people are of immigrant background. Again, Paris’s future seems visible in contemporary London. Between 2001 and 2011, the population of white Londoners fell by 600,000, even as the city grew by 1 million people: from 58 percent white British at the turn of the century, London is currently 45 percent white.
While rich Parisians may not miss the presence of the middle class, they do need people to bus tables, trim shrubbery, watch babies, and change bedpans. Immigrants—not native French workers—do most of these jobs. Why this should be so is an economic controversy. Perhaps migrants will do certain tasks that French people will not—at least not at the prevailing wage. Perhaps employers don’t relish paying €10 an hour to a native Frenchman who, ten years earlier, was making €20 in his old position and has resentments to match. Perhaps the current situation is an example of the economic law named after the eighteenth-century French economist Jean-Baptiste Say: a huge supply of menial labor from the developing world has created its own demand.
This is not Guilluy’s subject, though. He aims only to show that, even if French people were willing to do the work that gets offered in these prosperous urban centers, there’d be no way for them to do it, because there is no longer any place for them to live. As a new bourgeoisie has taken over the private housing stock, poor foreigners have taken over the public—which thus serves the metropolitan rich as a kind of taxpayer-subsidized servants’ quarters. Public-housing inhabitants are almost never ethnically French; the prevailing culture there nowadays is often heavily, intimidatingly Muslim.
At the opening of his new book, Guilluy describes twenty-first-century France as “an ‘American’ society like any other, unequal and multicultural.” It’s a controversial premise—that inequality and racial diversity are linked as part of the same (American-type) system and that they progress or decline together. Though this premise has been confirmed in much of the West for half a century, the assertion will shock many Americans, conditioned to place “inequality” (bad) and “diversity” (good) at opposite poles of a Manichean moral order. This disconnect is a key reason American political discussions have turned so illogical and rancorous. Certain arguments—for instance, that raising the incomes of American workers requires limiting immigration—can be cast as either sensible or superstitious, legitimate or illegitimate, good or evil, depending on whether the person making them is deemed to be doing so on the grounds of economics or identity....
France’s most dangerous political battles play out against this backdrop. The central fact is the 70 percent that we just spoke of: they oppose immigration and are worried, we can safely assume, about the prospects for a multiethnic society. Their wishes are consistent, their passions high; and a democracy is supposed to translate the wishes and passions of the people into government action. Yet that hasn’t happened in France.
Guilluy breaks down public opinion on immigration by class. Top executives (at 54 percent) are content with the current number of migrants in France. But only 38 percent of mid-level professionals, 27 percent of laborers, and 23 percent of clerical workers feel similarly....
As Paris has become not just the richest city in France but the richest city in the history of France, its residents have come to describe their politics as “on the left”—a judgment that tomorrow’s historians might dispute. Most often, Parisians mean what Guilluy calls la gauche hashtag, or what we might call the “glass-ceiling Left,” preoccupied with redistribution among, not from, elites: we may have done nothing for the poor, but we did appoint the first disabled lesbian parking commissioner....
Never have conditions been more favorable for deluding a class of fortunate people into thinking that they owe their privilege to being nicer, or smarter, or more honest, than everyone else. Why would they think otherwise? They never meet anyone who disagrees with them. The immigrants with whom the creatives share the city are dazzlingly different, exotic, even frightening, but on the central question of our time—whether the global economic system is working or failing—they see eye to eye....
Those outside the city gates in la France périphérique are invisible, their wishes incomprehensible. It’s as if they don’t exist. But they do.
The two traditional French parties—the Republicans, who once followed a conservative program elaborated by Charles de Gaulle; and the Socialists, who once followed socialism—still compete for votes, but along an ever-narrowing spectrum of issues. The real divide is no longer between the “Right” and the “Left” but between the metropoles and the peripheries. The traditional parties thrive in the former. The National Front (FN) is the party of the outside.
French elites have convinced themselves that their social supremacy rests not on their economic might but on their common decency. Doing so allows them to “present the losers of globalization as embittered people who have problems with diversity,” says Guilluy. It’s not our privilege that the French deplorables resent, the elites claim; it’s the color of some of our employees’ skin. French elites have a thesaurus full of colorful vocabulary for those who resist the open society: repli (“reaction”), crispation identitaire (“ethnic tension”), and populisme (an accusation equivalent to fascism, which somehow does not require an equivalent level of proof). One need not say anything racist or hateful to be denounced as a member of “white, xenophobic France,” or even as a “fascist.” To express mere discontent with the political system is dangerous enough. It is to faire le jeu de (“play the game of”) the National Front....
In France, political correctness is more than a ridiculous set of opinions; it’s also—and primarily—a tool of government coercion. Not only does it tilt any political discussion in favor of one set of arguments; it also gives the ruling class a doubt-expelling myth that provides a constant boost to morale and esprit de corps, much as class systems did in the days before democracy. People tend to snicker when the question of political correctness is raised: its practitioners because no one wants to be thought politically correct; and its targets because no one wants to admit to being coerced. But it determines the current polarity in French politics. Where you stand depends largely on whether you believe that antiracism is a sincere response to a genuine upsurge of public hatred or an opportunistic posture for elites seeking to justify their rule....
Like much in French intellectual life, Guilluy’s newest book is intelligent, original, and rather slapdash. Its maps, while brilliantly conceived, are poorly explained. Its forays into social science are mis-designed—Guilluy’s “indices of fragility” are based on redundant, highly correlated factors that exaggerate the points he means to make. The book has been assembled sloppily and, it seems, hastily. Long prose passages turn up twice on the same page, as if the editor spilled a cup of coffee while cutting and pasting....
But as the prospect of rising in the world is hampered or extinguished, the inducements to ideological conformism weaken. Dissent appears. Political correctness grows more draconian. Finally the ruling class reaches a dangerous stage, in which it begins to lose not only its legitimacy but also a sense of what its legitimacy rested on in the first place.
After every new terror attack in Europe, there are a flurry of articles congratulating the residents of Paris, or Stockholm, or Dortmund, or Berlin. They're congratulated on their sensible, low-key reaction to the attack, and their commitment to resuming their lives without interruption, which is said to "deny the terrorists a victory" or some such.
This is the wrong reaction. The reaction to a spectacular crime or mass killing should differ according to the circumstances.
Category 1 of mass killing is something like Winnenden (g), in which a 17-year-old German boy took his father's gun and killed 15 of his classmates before ending his own life. This is the sort of attack in which a measured response is appropriate. These kinds of mass killings can't be prevented in a modern, free society. They will occur at irregular intervals, and nothing can be done to completely prevent them. They are just a tragic but inevitable incident of life in a free society with a lot of social alienation. A calm, measured response is appropriate, because it is foolish to get extremely upset about something that cannot be prevented.
Category 2 of mass killing is a terror attack carried out on European soil by a foreigner. Like the Stockholm truck attack, which was carried out by an Uzbek man, a failed asylum-seeker who had already been denied residency in Sweden. Or the Berlin Christmas market attack, carried out by a known violent criminal and radical Islamist who also was supposed to have been deported from Germany, but who was allowed to stay in the country (g) because of a series of bureaucratic snafus so long, and so buffoonish, that it beggars imagination. As a result, 12 people were killed, and dozens of others grievously mutilated. Or the case of the Afghan man who raped and murdered a medical student in Freiburg in 2016. He had been let into Germany despite having been sentenced to 10 years prison in Greece for attempting to murder a young woman there -- he threw her off a 10-meter cliff (g), severely injuring her.
We shouldn't be responding to Category 2 events calmly. They should never have occurred at all. The only reason they did occur here in Germany, or Sweden, or Paris, is because of the incompetence of politicians and bureaucrats. None of these men had a legal reason to enter Europe. Two of them had already lost their asylum claims and were supposed to be deported. Yet the authorities failed to enforce the laws, and people died and were horribly injured as a result.
What citizens should be saying is not "They can't intimidate us, we're going to go on about our business, we'll show the terrorists how mature we are." That's the right response to a homegrown, under-the-radar crime.
What citizens should be saying is: "It's time to find out exactly who let these homicidal maniacs into our country, and who let them stay. And once these people are found, they should be fired for incompetence -- at the very minimum. And then the laws should be changed so that we can finally stop letting killers into our country."
To meekly accept this incompetence and recklessness from public officials is a sign of failure, resignation, and complacency. They're the signs of a failing democracy in which the public has given up on ever being able to hold their elected officials accountable, even for gross recklessness.
None of this is "right-wing". In a democracy, demanding accountability from elected officials isn't just a right, it's a duty. One that Germans seem to be forgetting lately.
How does the historical experience of the African countries compare with the performance of the low-income Asian economies? Historical data for Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Vietnam over the 2000–10 period (Figures 8 and 9) reveal the strength of employment growth in industry and services for the south and east Asian countries relative to average growth.
The change in employment shares for both industry and services for these countries is higher than for almost all of the sub-Saharan African countries with the exception of services employment growth in Ghana, Senegal, Rwanda, and Tanzania (Figure 8 compared with Figure 6). This result was possible for a variety of reasons:
-- There was a very labor-intensive pattern of growth in industry, with annual industry employment growth rates between 6 and 8 percent for Bangladesh and Vietnam and almost 20 percent for Cambodia. This compares with an average employment growth rate of 4 percent per annum for low-income countries with limited natural resources in sub-Saharan Africa.
-- A much lower labor force growth in the Asian economies meant that a lower share of labor got stuck in agriculture.
-- Even though overall productivity rose rapidly, the strongly labor-intensive growth in industry and services actually dragged down relative productivity slightly in these sectors (the data points for these sectors are found in the lower right-hand side of Figure 9)....
With the majority of new jobs created in countries currently classified as low income (such as Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia), the agricultural sector remains important for creating employment. Stronger growth in other sectors could push this estimate down slightly, but it is unlikely that the labor force in agriculture will shrink over the nextdecade—young people seeking jobs will simply have no other option. If African agriculture realizes its potential, however, agricultural jobs could be more productive, higher-earning jobs.
A major factor in the slow-moving employment distribution is the very high growth rate of the labor force. Indeed, the share of industrial wage jobs in total employment rises only from 2.3 to 3.2 percent because the jobs are growing from such a small base relative to the projected increase in the labor force.
A major element of structural transformation is the movement of workers from low-productivity to more productive activities....
The analysis shows that a major, and often underappreciated, factor behind the slow employment transformation in sub-Saharan Africa compared with the Asian benchmarks was demographics—a labor force growing much faster in sub-Saharan Africa. But another factor was the importance of the mining sector in the growth and employment patterns of sub-Saharan Africa’s industrial sector, and weak productivity in the service sectors because of the high share of household enterprises. Sub-Saharan Africa has a large labor productivity dispersion within the services sectors, including a highly productive financial sector but a number of low-productivity household enterprises in the trading and personal services sectors. Looking forward to 2020 and using optimistic assumptions on output growth, the prospects are good for overall productivity growth in the region. But the employment absorption in the nonagricultural sectors will occur mainly in the services sector and nontradables industrial sector (construction, utilities) rather than in manufacturing.
This report's interesting for a few reasons. First, it disproves a cliche you see invoked incessantly on German talk shows. This is the idea that Africa's economic problems are caused by Europe's agricultural policies, which favor native farmers over African ones. Because Europe subsidizes cane sugar, goes the cliche, it is no longer economical for African farmers to grow similar crops. This, in turn, causes poverty, which sends people to Europe.
The first problem with this cliche is that it's never accompanied by numbers. The typical set-up is for some German journalist to interview some African farmer, who points to his fields and says European competition is destroying him. The assumption is, as always, that no ordinary person living in a third-world country is capable of being mistaken or, God forbid, shading the truth. I have yet to see a credulous German journalist ever critically examine these statements.
If they interview anyone for backup, it's always some "expert" (as often as not with a nose-ring, ponytail or the like) with an advocacy group, who uncritically repeats the canard that Western agriculture policies are screwing African farmers, without ever explaining exactly how this is so, or how significant a factor it actually is, or whether other causes might also contribute to the problem. Oh, and as with all experts with whom the German reporter agrees, no mention is ever made of actual qualifications.
Nor do any of these development experts ever explain how we might eliminate European agricultural subsidies. These subsidies exist because European farmers are politically powerful, and generally popular. The average European wants to see mid-sized (especially organic!) farms continue to operate near them inside their own country, and therefore they support farm subsidies. It's perfectly rational for them to do this. There's nothing wrong with preferring policies which assist people 10 kilometers away from you instead of people 10,000 km away. This is how human nature has always worked, and you defy it at your peril. Especially in France, where farmers can and do bring the whole country to its knees whenever prices drop.
But even aside from these points, the paper shows this argument's just wrong. The point should not be to make it easier for Africans to operate small-scale, low-productivity farming operations. They should be discouraged from doing this. Asian economies became richer by reducing the share of workers in small-scale farming, and redeploying them to more-productive sectors of the economy. Of course, the remedy might come from greatly increasing the productivity of African agriculture by consolidation, but we all know what that means, and how popular that sort of thing is among European Greens.
It would be one thing if population growth were small. But alas, as the paper points out, it's still much too large. Too many young people chasing too few reasonably-paid jobs.
The upshot is clear: For the next decades, without radical policy changes which don't seem likely, sub-Saharan Africa will produce tens -- perhaps hundreds -- of millions more young people than its low-productivity economies can provide meaningful employment for. All of these young people see every day how rich Europe appears on their smartphones. Uncounted millions will try to get to Europe by any means possible.
European politicians pride themselves on how seriously they take the challenge of long-term global warming. But very few are taking the short-term challenge of massive population flows from Africa seriously.
Once again, it's time to play guess the real story. The papers today are full of praise for the police for hindering a planned riot (g) at the Leverkusen bus station. Around 200 people had planned to travel there to engage in some sort of planned gang fight. The police intervened, arrested some people, conducted ID checks, and managed to prevent the worst. They didn't find any firearms, but did find various kinds of knuckle-dusters.
Neither the police nor any of the news outlets have given any details about who these people were or why they were gathering.
Which means one thing to any informed reader of German news: they must have been non-Germans. And indeed, the German tabloid Express gingerly informs us that most of those arrested had "an immigration background".
Now, it's by no means unheard-of for ethnic Germans to get together in planned fights. These are usually fanatical 'ultra' football fans -- young, working-class types. Here's a documentary about them called "Category C" -- after the classification schedule German police use to judge how "violence-ready" different groups of football fans are:
Whenever ethnic Germans get together and beat the crap out of each other, there's invariably detailed reporting, extensive hand-wringing, and musing about What It All Means.
When non-Germans do the same thing, a soft, comforting blanket of euphemisms is spread over the events, obscuring any interesting facts.
So, does anyone know what exactly was going on in Leverkusen? Was it Turks v. Kurds? Or two extended clans? Albanians v. Serbians?
The German newspaper Die Weltreports (g) on the case of a 14-year-old Jewish student from in the Friedenau suburb of Berlin who was harassed and attacked by his fellow students after he revealed he was Jewish. According to him, one of his fellow students told him: “Listen, you are a cool dude but I can’t be friends with you, Jews are all murderers.” He eventually had to leave the school.
A Jewish student being harassed, beaten, and insulted in the capital of Germany? This should be a major scandal, right?
Well, no. It has gotten some press coverage, as the Welt article shows, but not very much. Does this mean Germany really doesn't care about violent anti-Semitism?
Well, yes and no. To explain the response, we need, as always, to ask the question: Who is engaging in anti-Semitism? The Welt article, of course, never tells us. In that story, the young man is being attacked "by other children" or "by his classmates". Male? Female? Older? Younger? Ethnicity? Nope, none of that, thank you very much. All the Welt thinks you need to know about these violent anti-Semites are that they are "students".
They're the Students Without Qualities. Fans of the American sitcom Community might be reminded of the Greendale Community College mascot, the "Greendale Human Being":
Only at the end of the story do we get a brief hint of who might be behind these attacks: "According to Tagesspiegel, 75% of the students at the school do not speak German as a native language, and many come from Turkish and Arab families."
Let's now turn to Tagesspiegel, the Berlin newspaper that first reported on the case in German. There, we come gingerly closer to the truth. After indeed reporting that there were many Turkish and Arab students at the school, the Tagesspiegelstates (g) laconically, almost in passing: "According to the school's principal Uwe Runkel, this is also true of the criminal suspects [in the anti-Semitic harassment]." Blink and you might miss it, but here we finally have the truth: the anti-Semitic harassment did not come from Germans.
Fortunately, in this case we don't have to rely on the cloudy abstractions of the German press. The incident was originally reported in the English-language Jewish Chronicle:
Emma, who is British, said her son, Phillip (not their real names), 14, had been moved to an English language high school in Berlin .
Emma said she and her husband had originally been attracted to the school, Friedenauer Gemeinschaftsschule, which has a large proportion of Arab and Turkish children, by the fact it was so multicultural.
She said it had never occurred to Phillip to deny his Jewishness, and one day he mentioned it to his classmates.
One of them responded: “Listen, you are a cool dude but I can’t be friends with you, Jews are all murderers.”
The verbal abuse escalated to physical violence, until earlier this month, “when he was attacked and almost strangled, and the guy pulled a toy gun on him that looked like a real gun. And the whole crowd of kids laughed. He was completely shaken.”
“It was terrible,” Phillip said, “but I didn’t have time to think what’s happening at the time. Now when I look back, I think, oh my God.”
Emma said she decided then and there that “I am not sending him to this school any more, and that was it.”
The case underscores concerns that educators and parents have expressed for years in Berlin about the antisemitic harassment of Jewish pupils, particularly by Arab and Turkish children.
Berlin’s Jewish high school receives between six and 10 applications a year from parents who want to move their children away from schools where they are being subjected to antisemitic harassment, said Aaron Eckstaedt, principal of the Moses Mendelssohn Jewish High School in Berlin.
The requests generally are “in reaction to antisemitic statements coming overwhelmingly from Arabic or Turkish classmates,” he said, adding that “in most cases, the families complain about the relative lack of response from state schools” to the problem.
Being the target of anti-Semitic attacks seems to motivate people to actually want to know who's behind them. Indeed, the sub-head of the article reads: "Case illustrates long history of antisemitic harassment of Jewish pupils, particularly by Arab and Turkish children."
Now, to be fair, the principal has expressed dismay and regret:
When contacted by the JC, [the principal] Runkel said he regretted the antisemitic bullying of Phillip. He added he had hoped to help the student feel safe and also to make perpetrators face the consequences of their actions, but that obviously “for the parents it wasn’t fast enough”.
He said “a general approach in the school to antisemitism” was clearly needed, and was being developed.
Ahh, the "general approach" -- the Gesamtkonzept! You can't do anything in Germany without one. I am sure the principal actually is disgusted by a Jewish student being insulted and "almost strangled" at his school. But things get quite awkward when the anti-Semites in Germany turn out to be, er, not so German after all.
Although Turks and Arabs are allowed to point out the fact that anti-Semitism is endemic in Turkey and the Arab world, ethnic Germans can't really come right out and do so, for fear of being charged with stoking prejudice against Germans of Turkish and Arab descent. And there are a lot more of those than there are Jewish residents of Germany.
It's delicate, you see. Very, very delicate.
The problem with all this delicacy, though, is that sometimes people need clear information: "Emma said she and her husband had originally been attracted to the school, Friedenauer Gemeinschaftsschule, which has a large proportion of Arab and Turkish children, by the fact it was so multicultural." Apparently, nobody informed these folks that sending a Jewish child to a German school with a large Muslim population might not be such a good idea.
Euphemisms can be dangerous.
In any case, Phillip got the message: "As for Phillip, he would not necessarily recommend that other children reveal their Jewishness to classmates unless it’s 'a nice, quiet school.'"
By the time the firemen got there, there was no choice but to let the entire place burn to the ground in a controlled fire. Residents accuse a 21-year-old Somali man of intentionally setting the fire, and he has been arrested. Somalia, by the way, just peacefully elected a new President who was formerly a mid-level state bureaucrat in Buffalo, New York: "[T]he U.N., African Union, European Union, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development and a host of nations, including the United States and the United Kingdom, issued a joint statement congratulating Farmajo and thanking his predecessor for the peaceful transfer of power."
But it's not as if you could legitimately ask anyone to actually live there. Even though 10.5 million people somehow do.
Back to the arson. This sort of thing happens more than once a week in Germany. And no, it's not right-wingers tossing Molotov cocktails at the shelters. Right-wingers have burned down many migrant shelters, but they almost exclusively do so before anyone has actually moved in (g). The vast majority of fires set by migrants have occurred in occupied shelters. Fortunately, nobody has yet died.
These fires are due either to carelessness or mentally unstable/sociopathic young males taking revenge for all manner of perceived insults, from serving food during the day to non-Muslims during Ramadan to various idiotic personal grievances. According to the XY Einzelfall website (g), there were 89 episodes of arson of migrant shelters in 2016 alone. About half were accidental, half were intentional. Now, the last time I quoted this source, a reader said: "But some of these are hoaxes invented by right-wing media. You should check out Hoaxmap, a map of Germany which lists these hoaxes."
So I did. Hoaxmap currently contains 464 items of apocryphal anti-migrant propaganda which have been refuted, including trivial urban legends such as "they stole my geese!" or "they urinated in a cemetery!". As for false accusations of arson, Hoaxmap lists a grand total of...2. Neither of which was included in the XY-Einzelfall database.
I don't have to tell you who is going to foot the bill for the hundreds of millions of Euros in costs these fires have caused (one incident in Düsseldorf alone, in which migrants burned down a huge storage facility at the local convention center, caused €1o million in damages). Many migrants are now "aging out" of the shelter system and being sent out to seek local apartments all over Germany, government rent vouchers in hand. Yet many property owners are skeptical of renting to migrants, especially unaccompanied young males. All those pictures of buildings completely incinerated by migrants do have an effect.
Now, of course, the German government could have predicted and prevented this by not allowing the country to be flooded with hundreds of thousands of random young males from the world's trouble spots. Women and children refugees are much less likely to, you know, intentionally incinerate their own homes. But Germany decided to allow anyone in, including the 60% of all migrants who presented no documentation of their identity whatsoever (g).
Which means there are going to be a lot more random fires popping up all over. Statistically speaking, coming soon to a neighborhood near you!
I've pointed out repeatedly on this blog that I suspect a large portion of the young males who've poured into German in the past few years are not right in the head. Say you live in a place like Kosovo or Tunisia or Afghanistan and you're stuck with a young male child who is borderline mentally retarded or is displaying bizarre and erratic behavior which could affect your family's honor.
He's not exactly marriage material, since your whole extended family (which is where you'd first look for a wife) knows about his problems. You hear that if he can somehow make it to Germany and merely says the word 'asylum' in any language, he will be furnished with an apartment, pocket money, food and clothing, and free education and medical care. He might even be able eventually to get some sort of a job and begin sending money back. And in the best-case scenario, he might be able to import other family members in the name of family reunification. Germans have been incredibly generous with that.
So you scrape up $5000 to bribe a smuggler, and send him off. You now have one less mouth to feed, one less ticking time bomb which could erupt into family shame, criminal liability or litigation at any moment. Plus, you may even get financial remittances from him if everything works out.
As a result, there are now thousands, if not tens of thousands, of reports of very bizarre behavior in Germany coming from young males freshly arrived from the Balkans, Africa, and the Middle East. Probably the least harmful and disturbing signs of mental instability are the countless cases of public masturbation (see above link, if you really must).
But there are other incidents immeasurably more terrifying and bizarre, such as the Syrian asylum seeker who threw his three young children out of a first-floor window onto a concrete parking lot, injuring the two eldest children severely. In November 2016, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison (g) on three counts of attempted murder. Of his own children.
And now comes a 36-year-old Kosovar man, Fatmir H., who yesterday went on an axe-mutilation rampage in the Düsseldorf central train station:
The suspect in an ax attack at a German train station that wounded nine people on Thursday was a mentally disturbed asylum seeker from Kosovo, officials said Friday. They said there was no indication of any political or religious motive for the attack.
German police swarmed the main train station in Düsseldorf around 9 p.m. Thursday after a man on a commuter train began striking exiting passengers with an ax, officials said.
The suspect in the attack was identified in the German news outlet Spiegel Online as 36-year-old Fatmir H. On Friday, police found a doctor’s diagnosis inside the suspect’s apartment, some 20 miles away in the city of Wuppertal, as well as medication indicating that he was paranoid schizophrenic, according to Dietmar Kneib of the North Rhine-Westphalia state criminal police.
The suspect was being treated at a hospital for severe injuries suffered after he jumped off a bridge to try to escape police. Of the nine victims, four suffered serious injuries, though none were in critical condition, officials said....
The suspect, however, was not part of the wave of more than 1 million migrants who have arrived in Germany over the past two years, officials said. He arrived in 2009 and was granted a residence permit on humanitarian grounds
The attack occurred as a commuter train pulled into Düsseldorf central station shortly before 9 p.m. local time. The attacker suddenly started to hit passengers with an ax from behind, officials said. One of the passengers managed to push the attacker off the train, and the conductor closed the door, preventing potential further injuries, officials said....
According to police, the attacker tried to get back into the train by beating and kicking the door. When he was unsuccessful, he began walking up and down the platform and downstairs into the main hall. When police officers approached, the man fled across the tracks. The chase ended with the attacker jumping off a nearby bridge.
The brother of the 36-year-old suspect, who knew about his mental issues and knew that he had recently bought an ax, had reported him missing the day of the attack, authorities said. Police said Friday that they have not been able to question the suspect yet because of his injuries.
Among the victims was a 13-year-old girl who suffered severe arm injuries and two Italian tourists. Besides the girl, the other victims are between 30 and 50 years of age, officials said.
More than 500 officers were involved in the police operation, including special forces.
So Fatmir H. enters Germany in 2009. He is put under treatment for schizophrenia. All of this is happening at the German taxpayer's expense, of course -- I rather doubt Fatmir ever had a legitimate job. The authorities give him a residency permit based on humanitarian grounds, presumably because it would be 'inhumane' to send him back to Kosovo since he has a mental illness.
Of course, this raises many more questions: Does Kosovo have a healthcare system? Why yes, it does. It also has mental hospitals. Certainly not ones that meet German standards, but then again, that's true of most countries. Does every mentally ill person in the world have a right to transfer to Germany, so that they can receive care which meets German standards?
If it is inhumane for Kosovars to be treated in Kosovar mental hospitals, doesn't Germany therefore have an obligation to ship every mentally ill person in Kosovo to Germany to receive better care? Where is the justice in permitting one mentally ill Kosovar to 'escape' to Germany and receive Germany-level care, while leaving all the others to their fate? The only distinction is that this guy happened to make it to Germany. That's why he gets the advantage. Is that rational or just?
I'm sure the judge or bureaucrat who allowed Fatmir to stay in Germany thought they were doing the humane thing by bestowing a priceless benefit on Fatmir (a residency permit, something thousands of educated, skilled, law-abiding Kosovars and Albanians crave) simply because Fatmir happened to have illegally entered Germany. But these individual decisions add up to a deeply irrational policy.
And a few more questions: How would you propose to explain to an ordinary German why it's a good idea to let mentally unstable, potentially dangerous people relocate to Germany to live the rest of their lives on welfare?
How does this policy help the thousands of mentally ill Kosovars who can't smuggle themselves into Germany illegally?
Why should Germans add to the risk and expense created by their own indigenous mentally ill people by needlessly importing yet more mentally ill people from other countries?
What benefit does Germany derive from a policy which lets people like Fatmir stay in Germany, costing the German taxpayer millions of Euros, until they explode into violence and mutilate random strangers?
Oh, and in other news, the German government just announced that for the second year in a row, expenses for caring for migrants were higher than expected, over €20 billion (g) for the year 2016. Regional studies show that only about 5% of the migrants (most of whom are young, healthy males) have found any kind of job (g). And the Green Party and Left Party have used their representation in the German government to block the designation (g) of the Maghreb states as 'safe countries of origin', making it more difficult to deport the tens of thousands of young male criminals who recently flooded into Germany from these peaceful, stable countries.
Germany's immigration policy is not just incoherent, it's masochistic.
The Sächsische Zeitung reports (g) on the nearly-completed renovation of a former military barracks in Döbeln, Germany which has serve for 20 years as a migrant shelter. The walls were painted, fresh linoleum installed, kitchens and bathrooms installed or renovated, and 'culturally appropriate' squat toilets put in place:
The exterior gardening and landscape work is still ongoing. The article doesn't list the total cost, but it surely runs well into the millions. According to the project manager, the entire interior of the building was replaced 'down to the bare walls' to make room for 210 families.
The only problem, though, is that families were only a minority of the migrants streaming across the German border. Therefore, the first inhabitants to move into the shelter are 60 people: "only men, and one child. The asylum-seekers come primarily from Iraq, India, Pakistan, and Morocco."
Raising the question, once again: What are people from Iraq, India, Pakistan, and Morocco still doing here?
Let's just hope the shelter's new inhabitants don't decide to burn the place down. That's been happening an awful lot in Germany lately.
Trump's comments about Sweden have sparked interest in the USA on the subject of just how well Sweden's immigrants are doing. This is unfortunate, since anything related to Trump immediately becomes mired in controversy. But a number of American news outlets, after looking into the matter, have determined, ever so cautiously, that Trump sort of has a point.
The New York Times recently spoke to "Henrik Emilsson, an international immigration researcher at Malmö University." In Germany, "immigration researcher" has basically become shorthand for "open-borders lobbyist". The battle lines are hardened, and many German "immigration researchers" are still unwilling to concede even a single downside to mass low-skilled immigration to Germany, and usually end up arguing some form of "mass immigration into Europe is inevitable, so people who live here might as well just get used to it".
Perhaps because Emilsson teaches in Malmö, which is 40% immigrant, he strikes a somewhat more reality-based tone:
Is there any evidence that recent immigrants are having an impact on crime in Sweden?
Not the recent ones. There is a huge debate in Sweden about immigration and crime. And we know from earlier statistics that the foreign-born commit three times as many crimes on average as native-borns. But these riots and crimes in the suburbs, they are related mostly to drugs and gangs. Those people are born and raised in Sweden. It has nothing to do with the recent immigration. It’s the children of migrants and maybe people that came when they were young.
There has been this issue of sexual harassment. And there is some evidence that the new refugees are somewhat involved in this. But there are no official statistics on it.
What about terrorism?
Not particularly, because the people for example who have gone and fought for ISIS, they are also quite established — they are Swedes that have grown up here.
Have recent immigrants done more poorly in Sweden than people who came in previous decades?
It depends on how far back you look. For example in the civil war in Yugoslavia in the early 90s, it was a catastrophe when they arrived. There was the same panic. It took a long time for them to find jobs. But if you look at that group now, they are very successful. They have like 70 percent employment rate.
We don’t have these low-skilled jobs, so it takes a lot of training and education, and patience. Since 2006, the migrants have been more from failed states like Afghanistan and Somalia and Iraq, so they probably will have a more difficult situation. So in the short term it will be a big cost for society. In the long term maybe if they end up doing as well as Bosnians, it will be an asset.
Do you think that maybe the Bosnian — or, broadly speaking, the Yugoslav — experience is different because they are also European?
It’s mostly that often they were professionals. They didn’t necessarily have very high education, but they were specialists in different crafts. But they were mostly also Muslim, so it has less to do with religion, I think.
Stripped of all the hedging and padding, Emilsson basically says (1) Yeah, foreigners actually do have higher crime rates and are at least part of the reason for the increase in sexual assault; (2) the main problem is with second or third-generation immigrants; (3) it was really hard integrating the people from the former Yugoslavia; and (4) these newcomers are going to be a whole lot harder to integrate than the Yugos, since they have no skills, and (4) this is all going to cost Sweden a lot of money and effort.
The clear implication is this: a disproportionate amount of crime in Sweden is committed by the sons and daughters of former immigrants, and we just imported a huge new wave of immigrants who are likely to do even worse in Swedish society than the last wave. And they'll soon start having sons and daughters, too.
Emilsson then praises Sweden's integration efforts, saying they've done better than Denmark or Norway. But even though he wants to convey an overall positive impression, his interview does pretty much the opposite