Danish Social Democrats Abandon Mass Immigration as a Matter of Survival

Over at Social Europe, the Danish political scientist Peter Nedegard notes that the Danish Social Democratic Party finally admitted its core supporters (1) don't like liberal immigration policies; and (2) cannot be lectured, browbeaten, or bribed into liking them.

So the party did something shocking, irresponsible, and populist:

The Danish Social Democratic Party (SD) has recently changed course on immigration policy in a more restrictive direction. This change of policy is marked and should attract international interest. There are also certain indications that a similar change is in the pipeline in the other Nordic Social Democratic parties.

This policy change already seems to have borne fruit for the SD. While support for other European Social Democratic parties is generally in free fall, the Danish party is gaining in favour. The odds point to a Social Democratic take-over by the next general election (replacing the present center-right government) with the party chair, Mette Frederiksen, as prime minister.

Several factors lie behind the Social Democratic policy change on immigration.

First, welfare state ideology. SD believes itself to be the prime sponsor of the Danish welfare state. As various scholars have pointed out, there is a fundamental contradiction between a very liberal immigration policy and the survival of the welfare state. A welfare state simply cannot afford anything other than a restrictive immigration policy if welfare arrangements are to remain at a reasonable level. This has now been fully agreed upon by the Danish Social Democratic leadership.

The contradictions between a liberal immigration policy and the continued existence of the welfare state has most recently been emphasized in an analysis from the Danish Ministry of Finance, which shows that immigration from third world countries costs the Danish exchequer more than DKK 30 billion (€4bn) a year. This, of course, means a loss of public money which cannot at the same time be spent on the welfare state’s core activities....

Another factor behind the policy change is due to the party’s history. A leading SD member of the Danish Parliament, Mattias Tesfaye, (trained as a mason and with a Danish mother and an Ethiopian father) has recently published the book Welcome, Mustafa where he reconstructs the history of Social Democratic immigration policy. In this reconstruction, genuine Social Democrat grass-roots favor a tight and restrictive immigration policy, which, according to Tesfaye, regrettably was departed from in the period from the early 1980s until today. According to this reconstruction, a very liberal immigration policy and true social democracy relate to each other like fire and water.

Unfortunately, according to Tesfaye, the Social Democratic Party missed this fundamental truth for several decades when it was seduced by academic proselytes....

The third factor behind the policy change is due to the simple desire for survival. The Social Democratic leadership has observed how traditional working class voters have gradually left social democratic parties for more anti-immigration parties in Denmark as well as in other European countries. In Denmark, the Danish People’s Party (DF) has indeed taken a large part of the working-class vote, which would otherwise have been a safe bet for SD. At the same time, several Social Democratic leaders have mocked DF, which, among other things, has been called ‘not house-trained’. In many workers’ ears, however, it has been an insult directed against them.

Electoral research in Denmark has shown that many recent general elections have been decided on the basis of which parties voters expect to deliver the highest standards of non-liberal immigration policy.

European center-left parties have been massacred in election after election, and one of the reasons is that working-class and lower-middle-class voters don't trust them on immigration. Those voters are right.

In many of those parties, the idea (sometimes expressed openly, usually not) was to create a "new bloc" of social democratic voters by importing more immigrants, and publicly embracing immigrants and immigration.

It didn't work as well as they'd hoped, since it turns out that once they settle in, these immigrants: (1) have conservative social values; and (2) are no more eager than native Danes or Frenchmen to face fresh competition from new waves of unskilled immigrants willing to work for peanuts. Oddly enough, immigrants seem to have agency and a desire to protect their own bottom-line interests. Who could have known?

Meanwhile, the former social democratic base of low-skilled workers began to wonder whether the politicians who claimed to represent them cared any more about people actually living right now in France, England, or the Netherlands than they did about people who wanted to live there in the future. Not a good thing for voters to be wondering about.

Of course, a mere change in rhetoric won't be enough. Voters don't trust social democrats to do what they say, and that attitude is quite justified. It's probably too late.

We'll just have to see if this crazy experiment in giving your voters what they want, not what they hate succeeds.


Anna Sauerbrey, Like Germany, Misses the Point

Infografik-vom-kopftuch-bis

[source. A handy German field guide to Muslim head coverings. I see the four on the left every time I leave the house, although the niqab remains pretty rare; I see it 2-3 times a week, not every day. The irony is that almost nobody wears a burka in Germany, but the debate about this issue is called the "burka-debate".]

Which brings us to one of Germany's periodic, tedious Leitkultur debates. I'll let Anna Sauerbrey, the New York Times' Germany-whisperer, define the term:

Consider the topic of the moment among Germany’s political class — whether the country has a “Leitkultur,” or guiding national culture, or whether it is a truly multicultural nation.... The term surfaced in 2000, when the Christian Democratic politician Friedrich Merz wrote an article in Die Welt asking whether it is enough for immigrants to obey German law or whether there are other manners, habits, traditions and conventions that everybody should respect as well.

Sauerbrey herself counsels: "Germans will have to accept habits and thoughts that are unfamiliar or even disturbing. Not because we accept them, but because we probably won’t change them."

The first response which pops to mind (aside from how you can "accept" something you don't "accept") is: Why? Did they vote for this? I don't meet very many Germans who are eager to be confronted with "unfamiliar" or "disturbing" things. Indeed, I don't meet many people in general who are this way.

The deeper problem is that this debate dances around the only relevant issue. If German acted like the majority of developed countries and only imported immigrants with a proven track record of adapting successfully to other cultures, there would be no Leitkultur debate.

If you want foreigners to integrate easily into your society, pick foreigners who will integrate easily into your society.

This is not mystery. Düsseldorf plays host to the largest Japanese expat community in Europe. These folks of course preserve their own habits and culture, much to the delight of their German hosts. But because they tend to be well-educated and come from a culture which has broadly similar values to German culture, they cause no problems. The whole Leitkultur debate is not about what immigrants do in their own homes and businesses, but about aspects of their behavior in public and in interactions with institutions.

Japanese immigrants cause no friction at all. In particular:

  • Japanese immigrants don't engage in honor killings.
  • Japanese immigrants do not get radicalized by online propaganda and commit terror attacks on German soil.
  • Japanese immigrants don't form clan-based criminal syndicates which engage in violent street battles in the poor areas of German cities.
  • Japanese immigrants are happy to shake hands with members of the opposite sex.
  • Japanese immigrants do not believe religious laws should take precedence over civil laws.
  • Japanese immigrants don't insist their female children be exempted from swimming lessons or school trips.
  • Japanese immigrants don't commit crimes at a rate hugely disproportionate to their share of the population.

The list goes on. You could substitute "educated, worldly Muslim" for the word "Japanese" in each of those bullet points.

Germany is having a debate about how much (formal or informal) pressure they need to apply to "get" immigrants to fit in is because those immigrants aren't doing it themselves. And that's because Germany has imported too many of the wrong kind of people: uneducated young males from conservative, traditional Muslim societies (or the conservative, traditional parts of Muslim societies). These people have few or none of the preconditions necessary to thrive within a very different, much more modern culture than their own. Yet they also don't want to go back to their home countries, where standards of living are much, much, much worse than Germany in every way. Who can blame them?

Choose your immigrants more wisely, and the Leitkultur debate vanishes. Yet Germany keeps on making the same mistake, over and over -- importing people who cannot adapt to German society, and then being surprised when they do not adapt. As Albert Einstein Narcotics Anonymous once said, "Insanity is repeating the same mistakes and expecting different results."


Sexism, Stupidity, and Immigration

Critics of uncontrolled mass immigration claim that importing large numbers of Arabs means importing backward attitudes toward women into Europe, which will inevitably cause problems.

Of course they're right, as a recent ambitious Promundo/UN study of gender attitudes in the Arab world shows. Only about a quarter of the men polled have liberal attitudes comparable to those of the majority of European males. Large pluralities and sometimes majorities of people in the four countries studied (and not just the men) believe males should exercise guardianship over female relatives, that women deserve to be beaten once in a while, that women should stay at home, and other prejudices we're all familiar with.

So is the solution to ban all Muslim immigration? No, although doing so would not violate any law. Countries are permitted to engage in intentional racial or religious discrimination when they decide which foreigners to let into their countries, and they do it all the time. With a few exceptions, Japan keeps out non-Japanese, Israel lets in only Jews. Nobody has any right to live in a country other than the one they are a citizen of. Countries have every right to screen people whom they let in to ensure they're likely to adapt successfully, and the best-run places on earth do exactly that.

So a European country can ban all Muslim immigration, as majorities of French and Austrian people want. But I personally don't believe this is necessary or justified. What European countries can and should do is only allow in educated people. There is an extremely strong correlation between increasing levels of education and more tolerant social views. So it's no surprise that the study of Arab populations concludes (pdf, pp. 47-48):

These overall attitudes toward gender equality were assessed using the Gender Equitable Men (or GEM) Scale, an internationally recognized and validated composite measure of attitudes toward men’s and women’s roles and rights....

Younger, urban, wealthier, and single women also scored higher on the scale. Education is clearly driving support for equality. Both men and women with higher education, as well as those whose mothers have higher education, scored higher on the GEM scale, women notably so. Parental division of household labour ... also contributes to more equitable attitudes; men and women whose fathers participated in housework also held more gender-equitable attitudes.

If you want immigrants who will respect European values, pick ones that already have these values. And that means pick educated ones.

Keep the rest out. Period.

This is absurdly simple, and it's already the policy of nations such as Australia. In fact, it's even the policy of the allegedly "anti-immigrant" AfD political party, which explicitly endorses skilled immigration to Germany and explicitly cites (g, pdf, p. 59) "Australia and Canada" as models of successful immigration policy. Bet lots of you didn't know that!

For decades, Germany recklessly ignored education as a factor in immigration policy, pretending that all immigrants were equally capable of integrating into German society, and that a ridiculously easy "test" would solve all the problems. Germany is finally recognizing that limited immigration of educated people is the only sensible path, and ist starting gingerly down this road. It's decades too late, of course, and 2015's massive influx of uneducated immigrants remains a costly, destabilizing slow-motion catastrophe. But most German political parties have finally seen the light and committed to joining the rest of the developed world in preferring educated immigrants. The sooner change comes, the better.


Paul Hockenos on German Arrogance

In Foreign Policy:

One year ago, Germany was named the “best country” in the world, according to a poll by the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School. The poll relied on criteria measuring entrepreneurship, power, public education, and quality of life, among others. But for a growing number of Germans, the important thing was that it offered confirmation of their own self-image. Their country slipped to fourth in this year’s poll, behind Switzerland, Canada, and the United Kingdom, but that seems unlikely to do much to dim the self-confidence of a country enjoying a surging economy and growing international cachet.

Whether the field is migration or manufacturing, fiscal policy or renewable energy, Germans increasingly believe that they, and they alone, know best, at least judging from the attitude newly on display everywhere from newspaper columns to parliamentary speeches to barroom chats over beer. In German the phenomenon is summed up in one word: Besserwisserei, a know-it-all attitude, which the Germans themselves admit is somewhat of an engrained cultural trait.

But it’s increasingly clear that one country’s allegedly evidence-based Besserwisserei is another country’s intolerable smugness. Just ask Germany’s European neighbors, and others, including the United States, where resentment of Germans has been percolating for years, under constant threat of bubbling over....

German high-handedness is eliciting angry charges of “moral imperialism” from Hungary, and its central European neighbors, including Slovakia, Poland, and Croatia, largely concur. Meanwhile, during the first round of the French presidential election, candidates from more than one party chastised Merkel for dictating a German eurozone policy. “We order it, you obey, and tout suite,” is how the German publisher Wolfram Weimer critically summed up Germany’s new modus operandi during the bailout negotiations in an article titled “Virtuous Totalitarianism”. U.S. economist Paul Krugman repeatedly blasts Germany for “moralizing” on European fiscal policy, namely Germany’s obsession with budget discipline, which he considers entirely counterproductive. Since Germany’s setting of the onerous terms for the eurozone’s recovery packages, beginning in 2011, surveys in Europe show that many fellow Europeans consider Germans arrogant, insensitive, and egotistical (while, strangely, praising their dependability and influence in Europe)....

Of course, another reason German smugness can get under the skin is the fact that Germany simply isn’t nearly as universally superlative as it might prefer to think. A close corollary of Besserwisserei has always been hypocrisy. So Germany may browbeat other countries about their deficits today, but other Europeans remember that in the 2000s, when the German economy was in the dumps, and again during the financial crisis, Berlin consistently ran budget deficits in excess of eurozone rules — and avoided penalties for it. The deficits were critical for Germany to get its economy going again.

Meanwhile, Germany insists that other countries follow its lead on climate change, shutting down nuclear power stations and switching to clean energy generation. But Germany is Europe’s biggest burner of dirty coal (seventh in the world), and it’s not on track to hit the Paris Agreement’s reduction targets for 2020. Its best-selling export is big, expensive, gas-guzzling luxury automobiles, including diesels. The Dieselgate scandal caught Volkswagen and other German car manufacturers cheating on emissions tests.

And it’s no accident that the scandal was uncovered in the United States, far from the reach of German political and cultural power — nor that Germany’s discussion about the scandal has been just as focused on how the German auto companies in question can be saved rather than about the financial or moral atonement they might owe. “It’s obvious that the EU should take over emissions testing and that the commission should impose huge fines on Germany,” Lever says. “But it won’t, because it’s Germany, that’s why. It shows how much power Germany has now.”


European Welfare States and Immigration

Christopher Caldwell's 2009 book, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, is the best book on the European experience with Muslim immigration out there. It avoids the hysterical doom-mongering that plagues North American neo-conservatives and geriatric European reactionaries on this issue. But because Caldwell is an American and is therefore not bound by European taboos, he makes a lot of points which are rarely addressed in Europe.

His 2009 interview in Der Spiegel remains as relevant as ever, since the problems remain basically the same, even as their scale increases: 

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Are you suggesting there is no open discussion about Islam in Europe?

Caldwell: I think these things are getting much more openly debated than a few years ago. In the Netherlands and Denmark you do have a contentious debate. I think a lot of Danes and Dutch aren't really proud of the way their populist parties are discussing the issue of immigration, but it's generally much better if things are discussed openly....

SPIEGEL ONLINE: In your book, "Reflections on the Revolution in Europe," you cast a skeptical light on Europe's relationship with its Muslim immigrants. In your view, do Muslim immigrants pose a threat to the Continent?

Caldwell: I don't speak of a threat, exactly. This is a very important distinction. The debate up until now has been marked by two extremes. On the one side you have the doomsayer extreme, the people who say Islam is "taking over" Europe. On the other, you have people with the point of view that there's no problem at all, except racism. I think both positions are wrong, and I have tried to set a new tone.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Nevertheless, when reading your book, one leaves it with the impression that you think Europe will have real trouble integrating its Muslim immigrants.

Caldwell: Islam poses difficulties that other immigrant groups do not. Part of it is the growth of political Islam in the world in the last half-century. A large minority of European Muslims feel solidarity with the Muslim community abroad, and they feel at the same time that the West is at war with this world. That makes the transition into a European identity more difficult. But I think the problems at the cultural level are more important.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Such as?

Caldwell: A lot of overly optimistic people expect Muslims to give up, or to modify, their religion over time. They're going to change in some way, but we don't really know how. And attitudes around religion provide a lot of potential for conflict -- the attitudes towards women, towards family relations, sexual freedom or gay rights.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: The percentage of Muslims in the European population is very low. The total is about 5 percent.

Caldwell: Right. The population of Western Europe is about 400 million, and there are about 20 million Muslims. Nevertheless, the population (of Muslims) continues to grow.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: But to what extent is it really growing? You base this argument on a higher birth rate, but a number of studies suggest that in the second or third generations, immigrants have birthrates closer to the national average.

Caldwell: That is true. There are two things that will cause the immigrant descended population in Europe to grow in the coming years. One is that immigrants are still coming and the other is that birth rates, although they are falling, are still higher. But the real issue is not the size of the immigrant population. It is that their culture needs to be accommodated within Europe in a way that requires Europe to change its structures....

SPIEGEL ONLINE: To what extent are your views shaped by the fact that you're an American?

Caldwell: As an outsider, one has the advantage of seeing parallels between European countries as well as differences. I come from a country that has experience with a multiethnic society, and America's history has some lessons for Europe. Just because the European Muslim community is a small one does not mean it is uninfluential or that it can be ignored or that the problems surrounding it are trivial and will go away. Blacks have traditionally made up about only about 10 percent of the US population. But we have a horrible history of race conflict that has shaken our country for centuries.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Is America more successful when it comes to integrating immigrants?

Caldwell: For now, yes. I think the first reason is the ruthlessness of the American economy. You either become a part of it or you go home. There are more foreigners in the workplace, and that's where a lot of integration happens. And because most immigrants are in the workplace, you never hear, as you do in Europe, that immigrants don't want to work. No American would dream of saying that.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Why do you think that's the case?

Caldwell: There is no welfare state on the scale of that in Europe, and I think welfare states are a bad fit for large-scale immigration. In an ethnically diverse society, people are less familiar with each other, and they are correspondingly less willing to pay taxes for social benefits. Two-thirds of the imams in France are on welfare. There is nothing wrong with being an imam. But I don't think the French are very happy about paying what is effectively a state subsidy for religion in that way.

The welfare state is a key distinction. I can't count the number of times people have asked me: "But you come from America, the nation of immigrants! How can you be so skeptical about Europe doing what America's been doing for centuries?"

The first answer is, of course, that European countries aren't nations of immigrants. Historians will often try to disprove this by pointing to ancient population flows, but they never convince anyone (not least because those population flows were usually accompanied by massive bloodshed). The fact is that European countries have established, centuries-old traditions and attitudes that are odd and opaque to outsiders, but which mean something to people born there.

More importantly, the European welfare state is an obstacle to integrating low-skilled foreigners, because it means they never have to work. Of course, most of them do eventually find jobs, but at rates lower than the native population. The U.S. gives immigrants nothing. They are expected to find jobs by themselves, without hand-holding by the state. Sink or swim.

Of course, immigrant Americans do end up on welfare more frequently than the native population, but America has an Anglo-Saxon welfare state that provides temporary assistance during down times. It is telling that the former U.S. welfare program called "Aid to Families with Dependent Children" was renamed in 1996 to "Temporary Assistance for Needy Families".

Temporary. You will get help for some time, but then it will stop, and you'll need to find another solution: Move in with family members, sell your possessions, beg on the streets. But preferably, you'll find a job. Will there be a welfare case-worker there to help you find it? No, you'll have to find one yourself. Same thing if you're an immigrant. 

Northern European welfare systems, by contrast, provide a permanent, unconditional lifelong cushion of support. (Southern European welfare systems aspire to this but don't have the money or organizational competence to genuinely deliver it). If you simply choose never to even try to find a job, you will continue receiving health insurance, rent support for a small individual apartment, and a basic income, no matter what. It will be anything but luxurious, but it can never be terminated, because the state must guarantee every person in its borders a basic level of existence required by human dignity.

Thus, Americans tend to look at unskilled immigrants as thrifty, God-fearing, hard-working types willing to do nasty jobs. Europeans tend to look at unskilled immigrants as yet another potential addition to the welfare rolls. They're not wrong: in 2006 every fourth welfare recipient (g) in Germany was a foreigner. And that number has skyrocketed: a recent government report leaked to the press showed that as refugees leave the program of temporary refugee assistance and enter the official government welfare rolls, the number only of non-European foreign welfare recipients shot up 132% from 2015 to 2016 -- an increase of about 400,000, to a total of 698,872 (g).

That's a whole lot of people to support, potentially for life, with free government-financed education, housing, healthcare, and welfare. Of course, some of these people will seek and find jobs. But they'll be in direct competition with low-skilled native workers. Low-skilled workers have noticed that their wages have stagnated with decades. They are also going to notice fresh competition from hundreds of thousands of foreigners willing to work for a fraction of their wages.

But hundreds of thousands of these newcomers with either never look for a job, or never find one. And plenty of Germans will ask a simple question:

"How does it benefit Germany -- or me -- for politicians to import hundreds of thousands of foreigners who will simply live here on welfare until they die?"

Of course, many members of the urban haute bourgeoisie, and probably all church officials, will react with outrage to this question. But that's not going to stop people from asking it, and demanding answers.


Annals of Bizarre Migrant Crimes, Vol. ∞

A consistent theme on this blog is my suspicion that an unusually high proportion of the young males who were allowed to stroll into Germany presenting forged papers or no papers at all are mentally ill in some way. Probably not with severe schizophrenia, but with milder forms, and with various kinds of personality disorders. I can't find any other way to account for the huge numbers of them who have been caught displaying bizarre sexual behavior such as open public masturbation.

It's not so much the public masturbation but the fact that they often don't leave the scene after they're done. It's as if they lack insight into the fact that what they're doing is illegal and will have consequences. And lack of insight is a component of many mental illnesses.

Which brings us to the latest in a depressingly long list of horrific sex crimes committed by young male migrants. I'll quote (g) the Bild tabloid, since it's the only newspaper in Germany that actually reports the facts of crimes. The accused, an Algerian asylum-seeker named Housin B., encountered the victim, Lea, at 4:15 AM on a bridge in the city of Mannheim, Germany, on 22 June 2016. He began following her. Out of a desire to shake him off, she agreed to his request for a selfie of them both. But then as she turned away and entered the front courtyard of her apartment building (my translation, skip if you're sensitive),

Housin B. forced her in to the courtyard and then attacked her brutally. The first state's attorney...described the events: "The defendant strangled her from behind, then threw her to the ground. He then kicked her in the head, face, and shoulder until she was unconscious. After the defendant forced the blood-covered victim to perform oral sex, he then raped her and stole her gold chain.

"At about 6 AM, he dragged her to the nearby bank of the Neckar river, sat with her there on a park bench, and kissed her repeatedly."

Only when a jogger came to the aid of the severely injured and deeply traumatized woman at 6:50 did the Algerian finally leave....

Lea M. suffered an orbital fracture of the eye, a fractured collarbone, two broken ribs, strangulation marks on her throat, torn lips and labia and numerous abrasions.

First, let's get one thing out of the way: Algeria is a peaceful, stable country. There is no reason this man should ever have been allowed to illegally enter Germany. Once inside, he should have been summarily deported within weeks. But since a system designed to handle 20,000 applications a year was suddenly swamped with 50 times that number in 2015, it's broken down, and only a tiny fraction of migrants who've lost their court cases actually been deported.

Now to the circumstances of this crime. The mere fact that he beat and raped a woman is, alas, not in itself a sign of mental disturbance. Hatred of women and a propensity for violence are not necessarily a sign of impaired practical judgment or reality testing.

But to drag a severely-injured, blood-drenched, semi-conscious woman to a highly public place -- a park bench next to a riverside jogging trail -- and then to kiss her for almost an hour? That is freakish behavior.

The Algerian will claim in court that he was extremely drunk at the time and remembers none of this. This is the standard defense in these types of crimes by migrants. And there is certainly some truth to that -- there have been literally tens of thousands of examples of migrants being unable to deal with the fact that they now live in a country in which cheap booze is available on every street corner. But still, this orgy of unspeakable violence went on for over two hours, more than enough time to sober up.

As the statistics for 2015 and 2016 have begun rolling in, we have seen all my predictions (and those of any sentient adult with some experience of the world) about the 2015 migrant wave come true. There has been a sharp spike in violent crime, and the number of foreigners receiving welfare in Germany rose 132% between 2015 and 2016, almost solely because of migrants becoming legally eligible for ordinary German welfare (as opposed to special refugee benefits). I predict we will soon see another one of my predictions confirmed: that a disproportionate number of young male migrants will turn out to have mental disorders of some kind. And no, it won't be because of the trauma of war, since there is no war in the countries where most migrants came from.


David Goodhart on Anywheres v. Somewheres

David Goodhart, author of The Road to Somewhere, on the new political divide that explains a lot more than the old ones:

As with most ideas that are controversial but correct, I predict this one will go through a three-step process of gradual, grudging acceptance:

Step 1: "He's wrong."

Step 3: "Blah, obvious everyone knows this, totally unoriginal, tell me something I don't know."

I left out Step 2, which is "Oh, wait, he's actually right". Because everyone else will. Human nature, folks.


Christopher Caldwell on Christophe Guilluy on French Elites

If you want to understand what's wrong with European immigration policy, Christopher Caldwell's 2009 book Reflections on the Revolution in Europe is the best start:

In his provocative and unflinching book Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, he reveals the anger of natives and newcomers alike. He describes asylum policies that have served illegal immigrants better than refugees. He exposes the strange interaction of welfare states and Third World traditions, the anti-Americanism that brings natives and newcomers together, and the arguments over women and sex that drive them apart. And he examines the dangerous tendency of politicians to defuse tensions surrounding Islam by curtailing the rights of all.

He has a long new piece on the French real estate consultant Christophe Guilluy, who was become an improbable analyst of French society. Actually, not so improbable: Choosing where to live strips away the bullshit and lays peoples' actual preferences (as opposed to their public pieties) about multiculturalism, diversity, etc. bare. Guilluy uses urban geography to create an analysis of the divisions plaguing French society:

In our day, the urban real-estate market is a pitiless sorting machine. Rich people and up-and-comers buy the private housing stock in desirable cities and thereby bid up its cost. Guilluy notes that one real-estate agent on the Île Saint-Louis in Paris now sells “lofts” of three square meters, or about 30 square feet, for €50,000. The situation resembles that in London, where, according to Le Monde, the average monthly rent (£2,580) now exceeds the average monthly salary (£2,300).

The laid-off, the less educated, the mistrained—all must rebuild their lives in what Guilluy calls (in the title of his second book) La France périphérique. This is the key term in Guilluy’s sociological vocabulary, and much misunderstood in France, so it is worth clarifying: it is neither a synonym for the boondocks nor a measure of distance from the city center. (Most of France’s small cities, in fact, are in la France périphérique.) Rather, the term measures distance from the functioning parts of the global economy. France’s best-performing urban nodes have arguably never been richer or better-stocked with cultural and retail amenities. But too few such places exist to carry a national economy. When France’s was a national economy, its median workers were well compensated and well protected from illness, age, and other vicissitudes. In a knowledge economy, these workers have largely been exiled from the places where the economy still functions. They have been replaced by immigrants.

After the mid-twentieth century, the French state built a vast stock—about 5 million units—of public housing, which now accounts for a sixth of the country’s households. Much of it is hideous-looking, but it’s all more or less affordable. Its purpose has changed, however. It is now used primarily for billeting not native French workers, as once was the case, but immigrants and their descendants, millions of whom arrived from North Africa starting in the 1960s, with yet another wave of newcomers from sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East arriving today. In the rough northern suburb of Aubervilliers, for instance, three-quarters of the young people are of immigrant background. Again, Paris’s future seems visible in contemporary London. Between 2001 and 2011, the population of white Londoners fell by 600,000, even as the city grew by 1 million people: from 58 percent white British at the turn of the century, London is currently 45 percent white.

While rich Parisians may not miss the presence of the middle class, they do need people to bus tables, trim shrubbery, watch babies, and change bedpans. Immigrants—not native French workers—do most of these jobs. Why this should be so is an economic controversy. Perhaps migrants will do certain tasks that French people will not—at least not at the prevailing wage. Perhaps employers don’t relish paying €10 an hour to a native Frenchman who, ten years earlier, was making €20 in his old position and has resentments to match. Perhaps the current situation is an example of the economic law named after the eighteenth-century French economist Jean-Baptiste Say: a huge supply of menial labor from the developing world has created its own demand.

This is not Guilluy’s subject, though. He aims only to show that, even if French people were willing to do the work that gets offered in these prosperous urban centers, there’d be no way for them to do it, because there is no longer any place for them to live. As a new bourgeoisie has taken over the private housing stock, poor foreigners have taken over the public—which thus serves the metropolitan rich as a kind of taxpayer-subsidized servants’ quarters. Public-housing inhabitants are almost never ethnically French; the prevailing culture there nowadays is often heavily, intimidatingly Muslim.

 At the opening of his new book, Guilluy describes twenty-first-century France as “an ‘American’ society like any other, unequal and multicultural.” It’s a controversial premise—that inequality and racial diversity are linked as part of the same (American-type) system and that they progress or decline together. Though this premise has been confirmed in much of the West for half a century, the assertion will shock many Americans, conditioned to place “inequality” (bad) and “diversity” (good) at opposite poles of a Manichean moral order. This disconnect is a key reason American political discussions have turned so illogical and rancorous. Certain arguments—for instance, that raising the incomes of American workers requires limiting immigration—can be cast as either sensible or superstitious, legitimate or illegitimate, good or evil, depending on whether the person making them is deemed to be doing so on the grounds of economics or identity....

France’s most dangerous political battles play out against this backdrop. The central fact is the 70 percent that we just spoke of: they oppose immigration and are worried, we can safely assume, about the prospects for a multiethnic society. Their wishes are consistent, their passions high; and a democracy is supposed to translate the wishes and passions of the people into government action. Yet that hasn’t happened in France.

Guilluy breaks down public opinion on immigration by class. Top executives (at 54 percent) are content with the current number of migrants in France. But only 38 percent of mid-level professionals, 27 percent of laborers, and 23 percent of clerical workers feel similarly....

As Paris has become not just the richest city in France but the richest city in the history of France, its residents have come to describe their politics as “on the left”—a judgment that tomorrow’s historians might dispute. Most often, Parisians mean what Guilluy calls la gauche hashtag, or what we might call the “glass-ceiling Left,” preoccupied with redistribution among, not from, elites: we may have done nothing for the poor, but we did appoint the first disabled lesbian parking commissioner....

Never have conditions been more favorable for deluding a class of fortunate people into thinking that they owe their privilege to being nicer, or smarter, or more honest, than everyone else. Why would they think otherwise? They never meet anyone who disagrees with them. The immigrants with whom the creatives share the city are dazzlingly different, exotic, even frightening, but on the central question of our time—whether the global economic system is working or failing—they see eye to eye....

Those outside the city gates in la France périphérique are invisible, their wishes incomprehensible. It’s as if they don’t exist. But they do.

The two traditional French parties—the Republicans, who once followed a conservative program elaborated by Charles de Gaulle; and the Socialists, who once followed socialism—still compete for votes, but along an ever-narrowing spectrum of issues. The real divide is no longer between the “Right” and the “Left” but between the metropoles and the peripheries. The traditional parties thrive in the former. The National Front (FN) is the party of the outside.

French elites have convinced themselves that their social supremacy rests not on their economic might but on their common decency. Doing so allows them to “present the losers of globalization as embittered people who have problems with diversity,” says Guilluy. It’s not our privilege that the French deplorables resent, the elites claim; it’s the color of some of our employees’ skin. French elites have a thesaurus full of colorful vocabulary for those who resist the open society: repli (“reaction”), crispation identitaire (“ethnic tension”), and populisme (an accusation equivalent to fascism, which somehow does not require an equivalent level of proof). One need not say anything racist or hateful to be denounced as a member of “white, xenophobic France,” or even as a “fascist.” To express mere discontent with the political system is dangerous enough. It is to faire le jeu de (“play the game of”) the National Front....

In France, political correctness is more than a ridiculous set of opinions; it’s also—and primarily—a tool of government coercion. Not only does it tilt any political discussion in favor of one set of arguments; it also gives the ruling class a doubt-expelling myth that provides a constant boost to morale and esprit de corps, much as class systems did in the days before democracy. People tend to snicker when the question of political correctness is raised: its practitioners because no one wants to be thought politically correct; and its targets because no one wants to admit to being coerced. But it determines the current polarity in French politics. Where you stand depends largely on whether you believe that antiracism is a sincere response to a genuine upsurge of public hatred or an opportunistic posture for elites seeking to justify their rule....

Like much in French intellectual life, Guilluy’s newest book is intelligent, original, and rather slapdash. Its maps, while brilliantly conceived, are poorly explained. Its forays into social science are mis-designed—Guilluy’s “indices of fragility” are based on redundant, highly correlated factors that exaggerate the points he means to make. The book has been assembled sloppily and, it seems, hastily. Long prose passages turn up twice on the same page, as if the editor spilled a cup of coffee while cutting and pasting....

But as the prospect of rising in the world is hampered or extinguished, the inducements to ideological conformism weaken. Dissent appears. Political correctness grows more draconian. Finally the ruling class reaches a dangerous stage, in which it begins to lose not only its legitimacy but also a sense of what its legitimacy rested on in the first place.


Accountability, Please

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After every new terror attack in Europe, there are a flurry of articles congratulating the residents of Paris, or Stockholm, or Dortmund, or Berlin. They're congratulated on their sensible, low-key reaction to the attack, and their commitment to resuming their lives without interruption, which is said to "deny the terrorists a victory" or some such.

This is the wrong reaction. The reaction to a spectacular crime or mass killing should differ according to the circumstances.

Category 1 of mass killing is something like Winnenden (g), in which a 17-year-old German boy took his father's gun and killed 15 of his classmates before ending his own life. This is the sort of attack in which a measured response is appropriate. These kinds of mass killings can't be prevented in a modern, free society. They will occur at irregular intervals, and nothing can be done to completely prevent them. They are just a tragic but inevitable incident of life in a free society with a lot of social alienation. A calm, measured response is appropriate, because it is foolish to get extremely upset about something that cannot be prevented.

Category 2 of mass killing is a terror attack carried out on European soil by a foreigner. Like the Stockholm truck attack, which was carried out by an Uzbek man, a failed asylum-seeker who had already been denied residency in Sweden. Or the Berlin Christmas market attack, carried out by a known violent criminal and radical Islamist who also was supposed to have been deported from Germany, but who was allowed to stay in the country (g) because of a series of bureaucratic snafus so long, and so buffoonish, that it beggars imagination. As a result, 12 people were killed, and dozens of others grievously mutilated. Or the case of the Afghan man who raped and murdered a medical student in Freiburg in 2016. He had been let into Germany despite having been sentenced to 10 years prison in Greece for attempting to murder a young woman there -- he threw her off a 10-meter cliff (g), severely injuring her.

We shouldn't be responding to Category 2 events calmly. They should never have occurred at all. The only reason they did occur here in Germany, or Sweden, or Paris, is because of the incompetence of politicians and bureaucrats. None of these men had a legal reason to enter Europe. Two of them had already lost their asylum claims and were supposed to be deported. Yet the authorities failed to enforce the laws, and people died and were horribly injured as a result.

What citizens should be saying is not "They can't intimidate us, we're going to go on about our business, we'll show the terrorists how mature we are." That's the right response to a homegrown, under-the-radar crime.

What citizens should be saying is: "It's time to find out exactly who let these homicidal maniacs into our country, and who let them stay. And once these people are found, they should be fired for incompetence -- at the very minimum. And then the laws should be changed so that we can finally stop letting killers into our country."

To meekly accept this incompetence and recklessness from public officials is a sign of failure, resignation, and complacency. They're the signs of a failing democracy in which the public has given up on ever being able to hold their elected officials accountable, even for gross recklessness.

None of this is "right-wing". In a democracy, demanding accountability from elected officials isn't just a right, it's a duty. One that Germans seem to be forgetting lately. 


Tens of Millions Headed Europe's Way

The IMF just published a short paper which a development specialist characterized by this tweet:

A few passages:

How does the historical experience of the African countries compare with the performance of the low-income Asian economies? Historical data for Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Vietnam over the 2000–10 period (Figures 8 and 9) reveal the strength of employment growth in industry and services for the
south and east Asian countries relative to average growth.

The change in employment shares for both industry and services for these countries is higher than for almost all of the sub-Saharan African countries with the exception of services employment growth in Ghana, Senegal, Rwanda, and Tanzania (Figure 8 compared with Figure 6). This result was possible for a variety of reasons:

-- There was a very labor-intensive pattern of growth in industry, with annual industry employment growth rates between 6 and 8 percent for Bangladesh and Vietnam and almost 20 percent for Cambodia. This compares with an average employment growth rate of 4 percent per annum for low-income countries with limited natural resources in sub-Saharan Africa.

-- A much lower labor force growth in the Asian economies meant that a lower share of labor got stuck in agriculture. 

-- Even though overall productivity rose rapidly, the strongly labor-intensive growth in industry and services actually dragged down relative productivity slightly in these sectors (the data points for these sectors are found in the lower right-hand side of Figure 9)....

With the majority of new jobs created in countries currently classified as low income (such as Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia), the agricultural sector remains important for creating employment. Stronger growth in other sectors could push this estimate down slightly, but it is unlikely that the labor force in agriculture will shrink over the nextdecade—young people seeking jobs will simply have no other option. If African agriculture realizes its potential, however, agricultural jobs could be more productive, higher-earning jobs.

A major factor in the slow-moving employment distribution is the very high growth rate of the labor force. Indeed, the share of industrial wage jobs in total employment rises only from 2.3 to 3.2 percent because the jobs are growing from such a small base relative to the projected increase in the labor
force.

A major element of structural transformation is the movement of workers from low-productivity to more productive activities....

The analysis shows that a major, and often underappreciated, factor behind the slow employment transformation in sub-Saharan Africa compared with the Asian benchmarks was demographics—a labor force growing much faster in sub-Saharan Africa. But another factor was the importance of the mining sector in the growth and employment patterns of sub-Saharan Africa’s industrial sector, and weak productivity in the service sectors because of the high share of household enterprises. Sub-Saharan Africa has a large labor productivity dispersion within the services sectors, including a highly productive financial sector but a number of low-productivity household enterprises in the trading and personal services sectors. Looking forward to 2020 and using optimistic assumptions on output growth, the prospects are good for overall productivity growth in the region. But the employment absorption in the nonagricultural sectors will occur mainly in the services sector and nontradables industrial sector (construction, utilities) rather than in manufacturing.

This report's interesting for a few reasons. First, it disproves a cliche you see invoked incessantly on German talk shows. This is the idea that Africa's economic problems are caused by Europe's agricultural policies, which favor native farmers over African ones. Because Europe subsidizes cane sugar, goes the cliche, it is no longer economical for African farmers to grow similar crops. This, in turn, causes poverty, which sends people to Europe.

The first problem with this cliche is that it's never accompanied by numbers. The typical set-up is for some German journalist to interview some African farmer, who points to his fields and says European competition is destroying him. The assumption is, as always, that no ordinary person living in a third-world country is capable of being mistaken or, God forbid, shading the truth. I have yet to see a credulous German journalist ever critically examine these statements.

If they interview anyone for backup, it's always some "expert" (as often as not with a nose-ring, ponytail or the like) with an advocacy group, who uncritically repeats the canard that Western agriculture policies are screwing African farmers, without ever explaining exactly how this is so, or how significant a factor it actually is, or whether other causes might also contribute to the problem. Oh, and as with all experts with whom the German reporter agrees, no mention is ever made of actual qualifications.

Nor do any of these development experts ever explain how we might eliminate European agricultural subsidies. These subsidies exist because European farmers are politically powerful, and generally popular. The average European wants to see mid-sized (especially organic!) farms continue to operate near them inside their own country, and therefore they support farm subsidies. It's perfectly rational for them to do this. There's nothing wrong with preferring policies which assist people 10 kilometers away from you instead of people 10,000 km away. This is how human nature has always worked, and you defy it at your peril. Especially in France, where farmers can and do bring the whole country to its knees whenever prices drop.

But even aside from these points, the paper shows this argument's just wrong. The point should not be to make it easier for Africans to operate small-scale, low-productivity farming operations. They should be discouraged from doing this. Asian economies became richer by reducing the share of workers in small-scale farming, and redeploying them to more-productive sectors of the economy. Of course, the remedy might come from greatly increasing the productivity of African agriculture by consolidation, but we all know what that means, and how popular that sort of thing is among European Greens.

It would be one thing if population growth were small. But alas, as the paper points out, it's still much too large. Too many young people chasing too few reasonably-paid jobs.

The upshot is clear: For the next decades, without radical policy changes which don't seem likely, sub-Saharan Africa will produce tens -- perhaps hundreds -- of millions more young people than its low-productivity economies can provide meaningful employment for. All of these young people see every day how rich Europe appears on their smartphones. Uncounted millions will try to get to Europe by any means possible.

European politicians pride themselves on how seriously they take the challenge of long-term global warming. But very few are taking the short-term challenge of massive population flows from Africa seriously.