David Goodhart on Anywheres v. Somewheres

David Goodhart, author of The Road to Somewhere, on the new political divide that explains a lot more than the old ones:

As with most ideas that are controversial but correct, I predict this one will go through a three-step process of gradual, grudging acceptance:

Step 1: "He's wrong."

Step 3: "Blah, obvious everyone knows this, totally unoriginal, tell me something I don't know."

I left out Step 2, which is "Oh, wait, he's actually right". Because everyone else will. Human nature, folks.


Christopher Caldwell on Christophe Guilluy on French Elites

If you want to understand what's wrong with European immigration policy, Christopher Caldwell's 2009 book Reflections on the Revolution in Europe is the best start:

In his provocative and unflinching book Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, he reveals the anger of natives and newcomers alike. He describes asylum policies that have served illegal immigrants better than refugees. He exposes the strange interaction of welfare states and Third World traditions, the anti-Americanism that brings natives and newcomers together, and the arguments over women and sex that drive them apart. And he examines the dangerous tendency of politicians to defuse tensions surrounding Islam by curtailing the rights of all.

He has a long new piece on the French real estate consultant Christophe Guilluy, who was become an improbable analyst of French society. Actually, not so improbable: Choosing where to live strips away the bullshit and lays peoples' actual preferences (as opposed to their public pieties) about multiculturalism, diversity, etc. bare. Guilluy uses urban geography to create an analysis of the divisions plaguing French society:

In our day, the urban real-estate market is a pitiless sorting machine. Rich people and up-and-comers buy the private housing stock in desirable cities and thereby bid up its cost. Guilluy notes that one real-estate agent on the Île Saint-Louis in Paris now sells “lofts” of three square meters, or about 30 square feet, for €50,000. The situation resembles that in London, where, according to Le Monde, the average monthly rent (£2,580) now exceeds the average monthly salary (£2,300).

The laid-off, the less educated, the mistrained—all must rebuild their lives in what Guilluy calls (in the title of his second book) La France périphérique. This is the key term in Guilluy’s sociological vocabulary, and much misunderstood in France, so it is worth clarifying: it is neither a synonym for the boondocks nor a measure of distance from the city center. (Most of France’s small cities, in fact, are in la France périphérique.) Rather, the term measures distance from the functioning parts of the global economy. France’s best-performing urban nodes have arguably never been richer or better-stocked with cultural and retail amenities. But too few such places exist to carry a national economy. When France’s was a national economy, its median workers were well compensated and well protected from illness, age, and other vicissitudes. In a knowledge economy, these workers have largely been exiled from the places where the economy still functions. They have been replaced by immigrants.

After the mid-twentieth century, the French state built a vast stock—about 5 million units—of public housing, which now accounts for a sixth of the country’s households. Much of it is hideous-looking, but it’s all more or less affordable. Its purpose has changed, however. It is now used primarily for billeting not native French workers, as once was the case, but immigrants and their descendants, millions of whom arrived from North Africa starting in the 1960s, with yet another wave of newcomers from sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East arriving today. In the rough northern suburb of Aubervilliers, for instance, three-quarters of the young people are of immigrant background. Again, Paris’s future seems visible in contemporary London. Between 2001 and 2011, the population of white Londoners fell by 600,000, even as the city grew by 1 million people: from 58 percent white British at the turn of the century, London is currently 45 percent white.

While rich Parisians may not miss the presence of the middle class, they do need people to bus tables, trim shrubbery, watch babies, and change bedpans. Immigrants—not native French workers—do most of these jobs. Why this should be so is an economic controversy. Perhaps migrants will do certain tasks that French people will not—at least not at the prevailing wage. Perhaps employers don’t relish paying €10 an hour to a native Frenchman who, ten years earlier, was making €20 in his old position and has resentments to match. Perhaps the current situation is an example of the economic law named after the eighteenth-century French economist Jean-Baptiste Say: a huge supply of menial labor from the developing world has created its own demand.

This is not Guilluy’s subject, though. He aims only to show that, even if French people were willing to do the work that gets offered in these prosperous urban centers, there’d be no way for them to do it, because there is no longer any place for them to live. As a new bourgeoisie has taken over the private housing stock, poor foreigners have taken over the public—which thus serves the metropolitan rich as a kind of taxpayer-subsidized servants’ quarters. Public-housing inhabitants are almost never ethnically French; the prevailing culture there nowadays is often heavily, intimidatingly Muslim.

 At the opening of his new book, Guilluy describes twenty-first-century France as “an ‘American’ society like any other, unequal and multicultural.” It’s a controversial premise—that inequality and racial diversity are linked as part of the same (American-type) system and that they progress or decline together. Though this premise has been confirmed in much of the West for half a century, the assertion will shock many Americans, conditioned to place “inequality” (bad) and “diversity” (good) at opposite poles of a Manichean moral order. This disconnect is a key reason American political discussions have turned so illogical and rancorous. Certain arguments—for instance, that raising the incomes of American workers requires limiting immigration—can be cast as either sensible or superstitious, legitimate or illegitimate, good or evil, depending on whether the person making them is deemed to be doing so on the grounds of economics or identity....

France’s most dangerous political battles play out against this backdrop. The central fact is the 70 percent that we just spoke of: they oppose immigration and are worried, we can safely assume, about the prospects for a multiethnic society. Their wishes are consistent, their passions high; and a democracy is supposed to translate the wishes and passions of the people into government action. Yet that hasn’t happened in France.

Guilluy breaks down public opinion on immigration by class. Top executives (at 54 percent) are content with the current number of migrants in France. But only 38 percent of mid-level professionals, 27 percent of laborers, and 23 percent of clerical workers feel similarly....

As Paris has become not just the richest city in France but the richest city in the history of France, its residents have come to describe their politics as “on the left”—a judgment that tomorrow’s historians might dispute. Most often, Parisians mean what Guilluy calls la gauche hashtag, or what we might call the “glass-ceiling Left,” preoccupied with redistribution among, not from, elites: we may have done nothing for the poor, but we did appoint the first disabled lesbian parking commissioner....

Never have conditions been more favorable for deluding a class of fortunate people into thinking that they owe their privilege to being nicer, or smarter, or more honest, than everyone else. Why would they think otherwise? They never meet anyone who disagrees with them. The immigrants with whom the creatives share the city are dazzlingly different, exotic, even frightening, but on the central question of our time—whether the global economic system is working or failing—they see eye to eye....

Those outside the city gates in la France périphérique are invisible, their wishes incomprehensible. It’s as if they don’t exist. But they do.

The two traditional French parties—the Republicans, who once followed a conservative program elaborated by Charles de Gaulle; and the Socialists, who once followed socialism—still compete for votes, but along an ever-narrowing spectrum of issues. The real divide is no longer between the “Right” and the “Left” but between the metropoles and the peripheries. The traditional parties thrive in the former. The National Front (FN) is the party of the outside.

French elites have convinced themselves that their social supremacy rests not on their economic might but on their common decency. Doing so allows them to “present the losers of globalization as embittered people who have problems with diversity,” says Guilluy. It’s not our privilege that the French deplorables resent, the elites claim; it’s the color of some of our employees’ skin. French elites have a thesaurus full of colorful vocabulary for those who resist the open society: repli (“reaction”), crispation identitaire (“ethnic tension”), and populisme (an accusation equivalent to fascism, which somehow does not require an equivalent level of proof). One need not say anything racist or hateful to be denounced as a member of “white, xenophobic France,” or even as a “fascist.” To express mere discontent with the political system is dangerous enough. It is to faire le jeu de (“play the game of”) the National Front....

In France, political correctness is more than a ridiculous set of opinions; it’s also—and primarily—a tool of government coercion. Not only does it tilt any political discussion in favor of one set of arguments; it also gives the ruling class a doubt-expelling myth that provides a constant boost to morale and esprit de corps, much as class systems did in the days before democracy. People tend to snicker when the question of political correctness is raised: its practitioners because no one wants to be thought politically correct; and its targets because no one wants to admit to being coerced. But it determines the current polarity in French politics. Where you stand depends largely on whether you believe that antiracism is a sincere response to a genuine upsurge of public hatred or an opportunistic posture for elites seeking to justify their rule....

Like much in French intellectual life, Guilluy’s newest book is intelligent, original, and rather slapdash. Its maps, while brilliantly conceived, are poorly explained. Its forays into social science are mis-designed—Guilluy’s “indices of fragility” are based on redundant, highly correlated factors that exaggerate the points he means to make. The book has been assembled sloppily and, it seems, hastily. Long prose passages turn up twice on the same page, as if the editor spilled a cup of coffee while cutting and pasting....

But as the prospect of rising in the world is hampered or extinguished, the inducements to ideological conformism weaken. Dissent appears. Political correctness grows more draconian. Finally the ruling class reaches a dangerous stage, in which it begins to lose not only its legitimacy but also a sense of what its legitimacy rested on in the first place.


Mass Immigration Destroys the Center in France

MAIN-Calais-migrants

Wherever it's allowed to happen, the reckless policy of mass immigration hollows out the political center and feeds the extremes. It's happening in France, and will be happening in Germany soon, as well. The most dangerous threat to European social democracy isn't neoliberalism, or multinational corporations, or lobbyists, or anything like that. The most dangerous threat is mass immigration. If you want social democracy to survive, as I do, you must oppose mass immigration. It's that simple. 

Take France. I've been following the French presidential elections pretty closely. As the vote approaches, Le Pen is holding her own against stiff competition. But another candidate, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, has mounted a surprising late rally. He's the leader of "France insoumise" (France Unbowed, or France Defiant), which is the farthest-left party with a major candidate in the elections. He's skimming votes from disaffected socialists who believe the party hasn't done enough to reduce unemployment and protect welfare programs, and from those former Communists who haven't already switched allegiances to the Front National.

And what do he and Le Pen have in common? They are both skeptical of mass immigration. Of course, Mélenchon chooses his words much more carefully (f) -- he says we have to combat misery and war, the root causes, we can't just turn people away in the middle of the Mediterranean, etc. But over and over, he has said it would be best if they never left their home countries, and that he is adamantly against any right to free movement. Macron, the centrist, is still in the race and might make it to the run-off, but there's no question that his liberal stance on immigration and freedom of movement in the EU is hurting him among voters who do not belong to the educated urban haute bourgeoisie.

Which is, of course, the vast majority of them.

Mélenchon and Le Pen are winning because they are the only candidates to come out, without waffling and euphemisms, and say one thing clearly: Mass immigration is bad for France.

The poll numbers are almost unbelievably one-sided on this issue. Only 11% (f) of French think immigration has had a "positive" impact on French society, according to an august 2016 poll.

11%. Let that sink in.

The poll also found (f) that 57% of French thought there were too many immigrants in France, that 54% thought immigration had brought changes of which they disapproved, and 60% thought immigration had degraded public services. 65% thought refugees would be "unable" to integrate into French society, and 45% wanted to stop admitting them altogether. 67% thought terrorists had pretended to be refugees to get into France, and 54% thought most immigrants presenting themselves as refugees weren't really refugees.

Now, you could say that these numbers may be exaggerated because of recent Islamist terror attacks -- but then again, when hasn't there been a recent terrorist attack in Europe? Thanks to mass immigration both today and in the past, these attacks, and these poll numbers, are the new normal.

This is why descriptions of Le Pen as "extreme" are false. And why former comrades denouncing Mélenchon for adopting her "extreme" views are fools. Le Pen's views on immigration are solidly backed by an overwhelming majority of the French, who list immigration and security as their top concerns, along with unemployment. And if you think unemployment isn't closely connected to immigration in the minds of many French people, you're naive.

The pro-immigration educated urban bourgeoisie has lost the argument, and lost the middle. If they don't begin generating candidates who actually endorse positions favored by a majority of the people they claim to represent, they will abandon politics to the extremes, which will have a number of drastic consequences -- the first of which will be the destruction of the EU.

The urban haute bourgeoisie has to bear most of the responsibility for undermining the political center in their countries (which has already happened), and for crippling the EU (which seems more likely every day). They will have to swallow their pride and recognize that people in their countries want policies which favor people in their countries. Given their self-satisfaction and their uncanny ability to ignore what's in front of their nose, I'm not anticipating a change until it's much too late.


Tens of Millions Headed Europe's Way

The IMF just published a short paper which a development specialist characterized by this tweet:

A few passages:

How does the historical experience of the African countries compare with the performance of the low-income Asian economies? Historical data for Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Vietnam over the 2000–10 period (Figures 8 and 9) reveal the strength of employment growth in industry and services for the
south and east Asian countries relative to average growth.

The change in employment shares for both industry and services for these countries is higher than for almost all of the sub-Saharan African countries with the exception of services employment growth in Ghana, Senegal, Rwanda, and Tanzania (Figure 8 compared with Figure 6). This result was possible for a variety of reasons:

-- There was a very labor-intensive pattern of growth in industry, with annual industry employment growth rates between 6 and 8 percent for Bangladesh and Vietnam and almost 20 percent for Cambodia. This compares with an average employment growth rate of 4 percent per annum for low-income countries with limited natural resources in sub-Saharan Africa.

-- A much lower labor force growth in the Asian economies meant that a lower share of labor got stuck in agriculture. 

-- Even though overall productivity rose rapidly, the strongly labor-intensive growth in industry and services actually dragged down relative productivity slightly in these sectors (the data points for these sectors are found in the lower right-hand side of Figure 9)....

With the majority of new jobs created in countries currently classified as low income (such as Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia), the agricultural sector remains important for creating employment. Stronger growth in other sectors could push this estimate down slightly, but it is unlikely that the labor force in agriculture will shrink over the nextdecade—young people seeking jobs will simply have no other option. If African agriculture realizes its potential, however, agricultural jobs could be more productive, higher-earning jobs.

A major factor in the slow-moving employment distribution is the very high growth rate of the labor force. Indeed, the share of industrial wage jobs in total employment rises only from 2.3 to 3.2 percent because the jobs are growing from such a small base relative to the projected increase in the labor
force.

A major element of structural transformation is the movement of workers from low-productivity to more productive activities....

The analysis shows that a major, and often underappreciated, factor behind the slow employment transformation in sub-Saharan Africa compared with the Asian benchmarks was demographics—a labor force growing much faster in sub-Saharan Africa. But another factor was the importance of the mining sector in the growth and employment patterns of sub-Saharan Africa’s industrial sector, and weak productivity in the service sectors because of the high share of household enterprises. Sub-Saharan Africa has a large labor productivity dispersion within the services sectors, including a highly productive financial sector but a number of low-productivity household enterprises in the trading and personal services sectors. Looking forward to 2020 and using optimistic assumptions on output growth, the prospects are good for overall productivity growth in the region. But the employment absorption in the nonagricultural sectors will occur mainly in the services sector and nontradables industrial sector (construction, utilities) rather than in manufacturing.

This report's interesting for a few reasons. First, it disproves a cliche you see invoked incessantly on German talk shows. This is the idea that Africa's economic problems are caused by Europe's agricultural policies, which favor native farmers over African ones. Because Europe subsidizes cane sugar, goes the cliche, it is no longer economical for African farmers to grow similar crops. This, in turn, causes poverty, which sends people to Europe.

The first problem with this cliche is that it's never accompanied by numbers. The typical set-up is for some German journalist to interview some African farmer, who points to his fields and says European competition is destroying him. The assumption is, as always, that no ordinary person living in a third-world country is capable of being mistaken or, God forbid, shading the truth. I have yet to see a credulous German journalist ever critically examine these statements.

If they interview anyone for backup, it's always some "expert" (as often as not with a nose-ring, ponytail or the like) with an advocacy group, who uncritically repeats the canard that Western agriculture policies are screwing African farmers, without ever explaining exactly how this is so, or how significant a factor it actually is, or whether other causes might also contribute to the problem. Oh, and as with all experts with whom the German reporter agrees, no mention is ever made of actual qualifications.

Nor do any of these development experts ever explain how we might eliminate European agricultural subsidies. These subsidies exist because European farmers are politically powerful, and generally popular. The average European wants to see mid-sized (especially organic!) farms continue to operate near them inside their own country, and therefore they support farm subsidies. It's perfectly rational for them to do this. There's nothing wrong with preferring policies which assist people 10 kilometers away from you instead of people 10,000 km away. This is how human nature has always worked, and you defy it at your peril. Especially in France, where farmers can and do bring the whole country to its knees whenever prices drop.

But even aside from these points, the paper shows this argument's just wrong. The point should not be to make it easier for Africans to operate small-scale, low-productivity farming operations. They should be discouraged from doing this. Asian economies became richer by reducing the share of workers in small-scale farming, and redeploying them to more-productive sectors of the economy. Of course, the remedy might come from greatly increasing the productivity of African agriculture by consolidation, but we all know what that means, and how popular that sort of thing is among European Greens.

It would be one thing if population growth were small. But alas, as the paper points out, it's still much too large. Too many young people chasing too few reasonably-paid jobs.

The upshot is clear: For the next decades, without radical policy changes which don't seem likely, sub-Saharan Africa will produce tens -- perhaps hundreds -- of millions more young people than its low-productivity economies can provide meaningful employment for. All of these young people see every day how rich Europe appears on their smartphones. Uncounted millions will try to get to Europe by any means possible.

European politicians pride themselves on how seriously they take the challenge of long-term global warming. But very few are taking the short-term challenge of massive population flows from Africa seriously.


Another Day, Another Incinerated Refugee Shelter

That huge black cloud you saw yesterday was yet another migrant shelter burning down (g). This one was a collection of renovated containers on the Carl-Diem Straße in Mönchengladbach, Germany:

Mg shelter

By the time the firemen got there, there was no choice but to let the entire place burn to the ground in a controlled fire. Residents accuse a 21-year-old Somali man of intentionally setting the fire, and he has been arrested. Somalia, by the way, just peacefully elected a new President who was formerly a mid-level state bureaucrat in Buffalo, New York: "[T]he U.N., African Union, European Union, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development and a host of nations, including the United States and the United Kingdom, issued a joint statement congratulating Farmajo and thanking his predecessor for the peaceful transfer of power." 

But it's not as if you could legitimately ask anyone to actually live there. Even though 10.5 million people somehow do.

Back to the arson. This sort of thing happens more than once a week in Germany. And no, it's not right-wingers tossing Molotov cocktails at the shelters. Right-wingers have burned down many migrant shelters, but they almost exclusively do so before anyone has actually moved in (g). The vast majority of fires set by migrants have occurred in occupied shelters. Fortunately, nobody has yet died.

These fires are due either to carelessness or mentally unstable/sociopathic young males taking revenge for all manner of perceived insults, from serving food during the day to non-Muslims during Ramadan to various idiotic personal grievances. According to the XY Einzelfall website (g), there were 89 episodes of arson of migrant shelters in 2016 alone. About half were accidental, half were intentional. Now, the last time I quoted this source, a reader said: "But some of these are hoaxes invented by right-wing media. You should check out Hoaxmap, a map of Germany which lists these hoaxes."

So I did. Hoaxmap currently contains 464 items of apocryphal anti-migrant propaganda which have been refuted, including trivial urban legends such as "they stole my geese!" or "they urinated in a cemetery!". As for false accusations of arson, Hoaxmap lists a grand total of...2. Neither of which was included in the XY-Einzelfall database.

I don't have to tell you who is going to foot the bill for the hundreds of millions of Euros in costs these fires have caused (one incident in Düsseldorf alone, in which migrants burned down a huge storage facility at the local convention center, caused €1o million in damages). Many migrants are now "aging out" of the shelter system and being sent out to seek local apartments all over Germany, government rent vouchers in hand. Yet many property owners are skeptical of renting to migrants, especially unaccompanied young males. All those pictures of buildings completely incinerated by migrants do have an effect.

Now, of course, the German government could have predicted and prevented this by not allowing the country to be flooded with hundreds of thousands of random young males from the world's trouble spots. Women and children refugees are much less likely to, you know, intentionally incinerate their own homes. But Germany decided to allow anyone in, including the 60% of all migrants who presented no documentation of their identity whatsoever (g).

Which means there are going to be a lot more random fires popping up all over. Statistically speaking, coming soon to a neighborhood near you!


Shipping the Mentally Ill to Germany as Asylum Seekers

I've pointed out repeatedly on this blog that I suspect a large portion of the young males who've poured into German in the past few years are not right in the head. Say you live in a place like Kosovo or Tunisia or Afghanistan and you're stuck with a young male child who is borderline mentally retarded or is displaying bizarre and erratic behavior which could affect your family's honor.

He's not exactly marriage material, since your whole extended family (which is where you'd first look for a wife) knows about his problems. You hear that if he can somehow make it to Germany and merely says the word 'asylum' in any language, he will be furnished with an apartment, pocket money, food and clothing, and free education and medical care. He might even be able eventually to get some sort of a job and begin sending money back. And in the best-case scenario, he might be able to import other family members in the name of family reunification. Germans have been incredibly generous with that.

So you scrape up $5000 to bribe a smuggler, and send him off. You now have one less mouth to feed, one less ticking time bomb which could erupt into family shame, criminal liability or litigation at any moment. Plus, you may even get financial remittances from him if everything works out.

As a result, there are now thousands, if not tens of thousands, of reports of very bizarre behavior in Germany coming from young males freshly arrived from the Balkans, Africa, and the Middle East. Probably the least harmful and disturbing signs of mental instability are the countless cases of public masturbation (see above link, if you really must).

But there are other incidents immeasurably more terrifying and bizarre, such as the Syrian asylum seeker who threw his three young children out of a first-floor window onto a concrete parking lot, injuring the two eldest children severely. In November 2016, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison (g) on three counts of attempted murder. Of his own children.

And now comes a 36-year-old Kosovar man, Fatmir H., who yesterday went on an axe-mutilation rampage in the Düsseldorf central train station:

The suspect in an ax attack at a German train station that wounded nine people on Thursday was a mentally disturbed asylum seeker from Kosovo, officials said Friday. They said there was no indication of any political or religious motive for the attack.

German police swarmed the main train station in Düsseldorf around 9 p.m. Thursday after a man on a commuter train began striking exiting passengers with an ax, officials said.

The suspect in the attack was identified in the German news outlet Spiegel Online as 36-year-old Fatmir H. On Friday, police found a doctor’s diagnosis inside the suspect’s apartment, some 20 miles away in the city of Wuppertal, as well as medication indicating that he was paranoid schizophrenic, according to Dietmar Kneib of the North Rhine-Westphalia state criminal police.

The suspect was being treated at a hospital for severe injuries suffered after he jumped off a bridge to try to escape police. Of the nine victims, four suffered serious injuries, though none were in critical condition, officials said....

The suspect, however, was not part of the wave of more than 1 million migrants who have arrived in Germany over the past two years, officials said. He arrived in 2009 and was granted a residence permit on humanitarian grounds

The attack occurred as a commuter train pulled into Düsseldorf central station shortly before 9 p.m. local time. The attacker suddenly started to hit passengers with an ax from behind, officials said. One of the passengers managed to push the attacker off the train, and the conductor closed the door, preventing potential further injuries, officials said....

According to police, the attacker tried to get back into the train by beating and kicking the door. When he was unsuccessful, he began walking up and down the platform and downstairs into the main hall. When police officers approached, the man fled across the tracks. The chase ended with the attacker jumping off a nearby bridge.

The brother of the 36-year-old suspect, who knew about his mental issues and knew that he had recently bought an ax, had reported him missing the day of the attack, authorities said. Police said Friday that they have not been able to question the suspect yet because of his injuries.

Among the victims was a 13-year-old girl who suffered severe arm injuries and two Italian tourists. Besides the girl, the other victims are between 30 and 50 years of age, officials said.

More than 500 officers were involved in the police operation, including special forces.

So Fatmir H. enters Germany in 2009. He is put under treatment for schizophrenia. All of this is happening at the German taxpayer's expense, of course -- I rather doubt Fatmir ever had a legitimate job. The authorities give him a residency permit based on humanitarian grounds, presumably because it would be 'inhumane' to send him back to Kosovo since he has a mental illness.

Of course, this raises many more questions: Does Kosovo have a healthcare system? Why yes, it does. It also has mental hospitals. Certainly not ones that meet German standards, but then again, that's true of most countries. Does every mentally ill person in the world have a right to transfer to Germany, so that they can receive care which meets German standards?

If it is inhumane for Kosovars to be treated in Kosovar mental hospitals, doesn't Germany therefore have an obligation to ship every mentally ill person in Kosovo to Germany to receive better care? Where is the justice in permitting one mentally ill Kosovar to 'escape' to Germany and receive Germany-level care, while leaving all the others to their fate? The only distinction is that this guy happened to make it to Germany. That's why he gets the advantage. Is that rational or just?

I'm sure the judge or bureaucrat who allowed Fatmir to stay in Germany thought they were doing the humane thing by bestowing a priceless benefit on Fatmir (a residency permit, something thousands of educated, skilled, law-abiding Kosovars and Albanians crave) simply because Fatmir happened to have illegally entered Germany. But these individual decisions add up to a deeply irrational policy.

And a few more questions: How would you propose to explain to an ordinary German why it's a good idea to let mentally unstable, potentially dangerous people relocate to Germany to live the rest of their lives on welfare?

How does this policy help the thousands of mentally ill Kosovars who can't smuggle themselves into Germany illegally?

Why should Germans add to the risk and expense created by their own indigenous mentally ill people by needlessly importing yet more mentally ill people from other countries?

What benefit does Germany derive from a policy which lets people like Fatmir stay in Germany, costing the German taxpayer millions of Euros, until they explode into violence and mutilate random strangers?

Oh, and in other news, the German government just announced that for the second year in a row, expenses for caring for migrants were higher than expected, over €20 billion (g) for the year 2016. Regional studies show that only about 5% of the migrants (most of whom are young, healthy males) have found any kind of job (g). And the Green Party and Left Party have used their representation in the German government to block the designation (g) of the Maghreb states as 'safe countries of origin', making it more difficult to deport the tens of thousands of young male criminals who recently flooded into Germany from these peaceful, stable countries. 

Germany's immigration policy is not just incoherent, it's masochistic.


Low-Skill Immigration is a Policy Disaster

A point I've made here a few times is that we can't really judge the effect of the huge migrant influx of 2015-2016 (which is still ongoing on a smaller scale) until all those migrants enter the workforce in Germany and begin competing against Germans.

Of course, they won't be competing against managers, engineers, or journalists. If they find jobs at all, they'll be dumped into the low-skill section of the German economy, to compete against the million of German workers who only have a low-level high school education or vocational training.

The results will be ugly. We know this because this has already been happening in the US for years now. Economists are generally right-wing libertarian open-borders types, and argue in favor of immigration based on what they claim are the positive overall effects on the economy. They rarely pay attention to the effects immigration has on working-class types, because, you know, who cares about those people? 

Harvard economist George Borjas, however, has studied this aspect of immigration -- mass immigration by low-skilled workers -- in the US for decades. He describes the results for American workers and the American economy: 

Over the past 30 years, a large fraction of immigrants, nearly a third, were high school dropouts, so the incumbent low-skill work force formed the core group of Americans who paid the price for the influx of millions of workers. Their wages fell as much as 6 percent. Those low-skill Americans included many native-born blacks and Hispanics, as well as earlier waves of immigrants.

But somebody’s lower wage is somebody else’s higher profit. The increase in the profitability of many employers enlarged the economic pie accruing to the entire native population by about $50 billion. So, as proponents of more immigration point out, immigration can increase the aggregate wealth of Americans. But they don’t point out the trade-off involved: Workers in jobs sought by immigrants lose out.

They also don’t point out that low-skill immigration has a side effect that reduces that $50 billion increase in wealth. The National Academy of Sciences recently estimated the impact of immigration on government budgets. On a year-to-year basis, immigrant families, mostly because of their relatively low incomes and higher frequency of participating in government programs like subsidized health care, are a fiscal burden. A comparison of taxes paid and government spending on these families showed that immigrants created an annual fiscal shortfall of $43 billion to $299 billion.

Even the most conservative estimate of the fiscal shortfall wipes out much of the $50 billion increase in native wealth. Remarkably, the size of the native economic pie did not change much after immigration increased the number of workers by more than 15 percent. But the split of the pie certainly changed, giving far less to workers and much more to employers.

The immigration debate will also have to address the long-term impact on American society, raising the freighted issue of immigrant assimilation. In recent decades, there has been a noticeable slowdown in the rate at which the economic status of immigrants improves over time. In the 1970s, the typical immigrant could expect a substantial improvement relative to natives over his or her lifetime. Today, the economic progress of the typical immigrant is much more stagnant.

Part of the slowdown is related to the growth of ethnic enclaves. New immigrants who find few ethnic compatriots get value from acquiring skills that allow more social and economic exchanges, such as becoming proficient in English. But new immigrants who find a large and welcoming community of their countrymen have less need to acquire those skills; they already have a large audience that values whatever they brought with them. Put bluntly, mass migration discourages assimilation.

The trade-offs become even more difficult when we think about the long-term integration of the children and grandchildren of today’s immigrants. Many look back at the melting pot in 20th-century America and assume that history will repeat itself. That’s probably wishful thinking. That melting pot operated in a particular economic, social and political context, and it is doubtful that those conditions can be reproduced today.

...

Europe is already confronting the difficulties produced by the presence of unassimilated populations. If nothing else, the European experience shows that there is no universal law that guarantees integration even after a few generations. We, too, will need to confront the trade-off between short-term economic gains and the long-term costs of a large, unassimilated minority.

Identifying the trade-offs is only a first step toward a more sensible immigration policy. We also need some general principles, combining common sense and compassion.

First and foremost, we must reduce illegal immigration. It has had a corrosive impact, paralyzing discussion on all aspects of immigration reform. A wall along the Mexican border may signal that we are getting serious, but many undocumented immigrants enter the country legally and then overstay their visas. A national electronic system (such as E-Verify) mandating that employers certify new hires, along with fines and criminal penalties for lawbreaking businesses, might go a long way toward stemming the flow.

But what about the 11-million-plus undocumented immigrants already here? A vast majority have led peaceful lives and established deep roots in our communities. Their sudden deportation would not represent the compassionate America that many of us envision.

Perhaps it’s time for some benign neglect. Many will eventually qualify for visas because they have married American citizens or have native-born children. Rather than fight over a politically impossible amnesty, we could accelerate the granting of family-preference visas to that population.

We will also need to decide how many immigrants to admit. Economists seldom confess their ignorance, but we truly have no clue about what that number should be. About one million legal immigrants a year entered the country in the past two decades. The political climate suggests that many Americans view that number as too high. History shows that when voters get fed up with immigration, there is no reluctance to cut off the flow altogether. Back in the 1990s, Barbara Jordan’s immigration commission recommended an annual target of about 550,000 immigrants. Such a cut would be significant, but it may be preferable to the alternative, which, in this political climate, could mean shutting off the flow.

Finally, we need to choose between highly skilled and less-skilled applicants. High-skill immigrants, who pay higher taxes and receive fewer services and can potentially expand the frontier of knowledge, are more profitable for us. But giving an opportunity to the huddled masses is part of what makes our country exceptional.

...

Many of my colleagues in the academic community — and many of the elite opinion-makers in the news media — recoil when they hear that immigration should serve the interests of Americans. Their reaction is to label such thinking as racist and xenophobic, and to marginalize anyone who agrees.

But those accusations of racism reflect their effort to avoid a serious discussion of the trade-offs. The coming debate would be far more honest and politically transparent if we demanded a simple answer from those who disagree with “America First” proposals: Who are you rooting for?

So, mass low-skilled immigration increases the welfare rolls, drives down the wages of the most vulnerable workers, increases the gap between rich and poor, and fuels social tension. Why does anyone think this is a progressive policy?


Kevin Drum Sees a Glimmer of Light on Sweden, Crime, and Immigrants

Donald Trump seemed to suggest that some terrorist incident happened in Sweden a few days ago. For this he was justly mocked. Then it turned out he was merely commenting on a news report he had seen on Fox about crime in Sweden in general. This is the report he was referring to: 

As with most Fox reporting, this is a mixture of exaggeration, anecdote, and legitimate information. Like many reports you'll see anywhere, for that matter. American liberals have jumped quickly to Sweden's defense. But as Kevin Drum points out, some of the defenses are bogus:

Donald Trump at his pep rally yesterday on immigration:

You look at what's happening in Germany, you look at what's happening last night in Sweden. Sweden, who would believe this. Sweden. They took in large numbers. They're having problems like they never thought possible.

Nothing happened in Sweden last night, which has prompted lots of IKEA and ABBA joke memes. However, Zack Beauchamp thinks Trump was probably referring not to something that happened recently, but to the alleged "rape epidemic" in Sweden ever since they started taking in lots of Middle Eastern immigrants. This is apparently a staple of the Breitbart-o-sphere. Unfortunately, Beauchamp then says this:

The problem, though, is that this “rape epidemic” is as fake as the Bowling Green Massacre.

Canadian reporter Doug Saunders rigorously investigated the narrative, and concluded that it “falls apart as soon as you speak to anyone knowledgeable in Sweden.” Official Swedish statistics do indeed show a high rate of rape, but that’s because Swedish law has an extremely expansive definition of what qualifies as rape under the law.

....These panics about immigration, instead, reflect a long history of sexual panics in the West about non-white immigrants. Etc.

Whenever I see writing that carefully avoids providing comparative statistics, my BS detector goes off. Sure enough, Saunders didn't "rigorously" do anything. He linked to an old report that tallies crime rates for the years 1997-2001—which is all but useless in 20171—and then glided quickly past his eventual acknowledgment that the foreign-born have "a higher rate of criminal charges than the native-born." If you're interested, here's the actual data from the report (tables 3 and 6 in the appendix):

These are very big differences. Now, Saunders also links to a study which suggests that "half to three-quarters" of the difference can be accounted for by socioeconomic status. Maybe so. But crime is crime. If you're the victim of assault from a Syrian refugee, you don't really care if it happened because he's Syrian or because he's poorer than average.

There's plenty more to legitimately say about this. If poverty really is a causal factor, maybe it means Sweden needs to be more generous. Other statistics suggest that the children of the foreign-born have much lower crime rates than their parents. And as Beauchamp says, "rape" in Sweden is defined pretty broadly.

Still, if we bring up this subject at all, we have to present the statistics fairly. In the US, immigrants seem to commit crimes at lower rates than native-born Americans. But Sweden is a different country, and the statistics suggest that foreign-born immigrants do indeed commit crimes there in much larger numbers than native Swedes.

UPDATE: I don't know just how interested everyone is in the minutiae of Swedish crime, but here's the crime rate over the past decade:

Some are up, some are down, but the overall trend appears fairly flat despite the large rise in immigrants over this period. On the other hand, preliminary figuresshow that crime against persons was up 7 percent in 2016, including a 13 percent increase in reported rapes and a 14 percent increase in child abuse.

1Apparently this is the most recent report that examines crime rates by area of origin. I don't know why Sweden hasn't done anything more recent.

A few observations:

  1. "These are very big differences."
  2. "If poverty really is a causal factor, maybe it means Sweden needs to be more generous." Sweden already provides some of the most generous social welfare benefits in the entire world, including to asylum-seekers.
  3. "And as Beauchamp says, 'rape' in Sweden is defined pretty broadly." No, it's not
    "I think it is a bit of a myth that the Sexual Crimes Act is so much tougher than in most other countries. The truth is that it is not that different,” Mårten Schultz tells IPS.
    In 2005, the definition of rape in the Swedish Sexual Crimes Act was broadened to include, for instance, having sex with someone who is asleep, or someone who could be considered to be in a “helpless state”. This applies to situations when someone would not be capable of saying “no”. A typical situation where the law could be applied is if someone who is drunk at a party falls asleep only to wake up and realize that someone is having sex with them.
    That would constitute rape according to the 2005 law, and not “sexual abuse”, which was the case before the law was amended. In this respect the new law did not criminalize behaviour that previously had been legal, but rather broadened the definition of what constitutes rape to include a larger number of sexual crimes." 

     

  4. The second graph in Drum's post shows steady crime rates. As I've pointed out before, this is what you would expect in a country with an aging native population committing fewer crimes, mixed in with a burgeoning immigrant population committing far more crimes per capita than native residents. If Sweden's immigration policies were different, crime rates would be on a steady downward trajectory.
  5. "Apparently this is the most recent report that examines crime rates by area of origin. I don't know why Sweden hasn't done anything more recent." I do.

And now, the tiresome but necessary caveats.

1. Does this mean all immigrants are criminals? No, the majority of immigrants in Sweden have never and will never commit a violent crime. The statistics show there is a higher crime rate among immigrants. That is all. If the rate of sexual assaults per year is 2 per 100,000 for native Swedes, but 20 per 100,000 for immigrants, this means it is indeed 100% accurate to say that the rate of sexual assault by immigrants is 10 times as high as that of Swedes. However, it is still extremely rare even among immigrants.

2. Does all of this mean that Sweden is collapsing? No, Sweden has imported a raft of complex social problems, but is not going to drown in a sea of flames.

3. Do I think Sweden should stop allowing immigration? No, I think Sweden should stop allowing immigration of too many of the wrong kind of people. Many fewer semi-literate unaccompanied young males with no job skills. Many more women and children refugees (for humanitarian reasons) and well-educated people (for reasons of enlightened self-interest. It's really not that hard, it's how most countries manage things.


Where Trump and Europeans Agree

You wouldn't know it from watching Tagesschau or reading the German mainstream press, but there's at least one thing Europeans and Trump agree on:

A majority of Europeans want a ban on immigration from Muslim-majority countries, a poll has revealed.

An average of 55 per cent of people across the 10 European countries surveyed wanted to stop all future immigration from mainly Muslim countries.

The Chatham House study, conducted before US President Donald Trump signed an executive order banning immigration to the US from seven predominantly Muslim countries, found majorities in all but two of the ten states opposed immigration from mainly Muslim countries.

Only 20 per cent disagreed, while 25 per cent said they did not know.

A ban was supported by 71 per cent of people in Poland, 65 per cent in Austria, 53 per cent in Germany and 51 per cent in Italy.

In the UK, 47 per cent supported a ban.

In no country did more than 32 per cent disagree with a ban.

I wonder how much coverage this poll will get in Germany. My prediction: almost none, except in "certain" press outlets (you know who you are).


"Mainly Criminals, Psychopaths, and Petty Thieves"

While we’re on the subject of contrasting grateful, peace-loving refugees who are mostly women and children with the motley crew of young males Germany imported, let’s look at conditions in one Düsseldorf migrant shelter. Well, a former migrant shelter -- it no longer exists.

After the migrant influx of 2015, one of the huge halls of the Düsseldorf convention center was converted into a massive migrant shelter for hundreds of unaccompanied male migrants. On June 7, 2016, the entire hall was burned to the ground in an act of intentional arson: 

The massive fire created a cloud of smoke which could be seen from everywhere in the city. The estimated damages are €10 million. Dozens of people were treated for smoke inhalation.

The trial was intentionally set by one of the migrants in the shelter. Now he and an accomplice are on trial in Düsseldorf for aggravated arson. According to testimony, the fire was set by a 27-year-old Algerian named Adel Z. Adel was enraged that food was being served to people in the shelter during the day, even though it was Ramadan. He wanted all shelter residents to be forced to observe Ramadan, no matter what their religious views. A 27-year-old Moroccan named Mohamed B. allegedly spurred Adel Z. to follow through on his anger by burning the place down.

A reporter from a website named nrw-direkt is observing the trial (g)*. His account of the testimony is worth quoting at length (my translation):

The testimony of the second witness was faster, less ambiguous, but more shocking [than the first]: The 57-year-old social worker stated that the shelter housed mainly "criminals, psychopaths, and petty thieves" (Verbrecher, Psychopathen und Kleinkriminelle). The police were called out there "every other day". He learned from a colleague that the day before the fire, there had been "extreme rioting" between shelter residents who were fasting and those who were not. He himself remember that after "loud complaints", shelter operator the German Red Cross had promised a warm lunch. However, this did not happen. Instead, snacks such as bread with sausage or cheese were provided.

During the meal on the day of the fire, two residents of the shelter insulted and threatened shelter workers. These were "the usual" threats and insults, like "fucking Germans" and "assholes", which were the customary insults used by shelter residents against German Red Cross workers. The witness also recalled threats such as "we're going to burn this place to the ground", "we'll set you on fire", "we'll kill you all", which were also everyday occurrences at the shelter. "When you're constantly insulted, you eventually get really sick of it", the employee said with a quiet voice.

"They found everything funny and awesome"

...After the fire broke out, he noticed many residents who were sitting on packed suitcases and "found everything funny and awesome". One of them filmed the fire with his phone. When the judge inquired whether he concluded that this meant the shelter residents knew about the plan to set the fire beforehand, he said "of course".

I know some German social workers, and it takes a lot to get them to describe their charges as "criminals". To say nothing of "psychopaths".

After the shelter was destroyed, these "criminals, psychopaths, and petty thieves" were distributed to other shelters all across the city.

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